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Introduction 
BACKGROUND 
This article will outline and review competition law case-law developments in the UK courts 
between 2013 and 2016. The author has conducted previous comprehensive studies of 
competition rulings by the courts in the UK, involving the application of both EU and UK 
competition law.2 This article updates the position to the end of 2016 and allows for a greater 
understanding of both competition case-law trends and the approach of the judiciary to a 
number of key procedural and substantive issues. It is clear that during the last twenty years 
the European Commission has sought to encourage and facilitate private enforcement of EU 
competition law, and a similar process has taken place in the UK since 1998, notably the 
introduction of the Enterprise Act 2002 which made provision inter alia for follow-on actions 
ďĞĨŽƌĞĂƐƉĞĐŝĂůŝƐƚŽŵƉĞƚŝƚŝŽŶƉƉĞĂůdƌŝďƵŶĂů ? ‘d ? ? ?There has been a further tranche of 
initiatives to facilitate private enforcement at both the EU and UK levels within the 2013-2016 
period. In June 2013, following a consultation on Collective Redress, the Commission 
published a Communication3 and Recommendation on Collective Redress.4 More 
significantly, the Consumer Rights Act 2015, in addition to significantly enhancing the role of 
the Competition Appeal Tribunal in competition law litigation,5 introduced a revised collective 
redress mechanism in the UK with the possibility of opt-out collective competition litigation.6 
                                                          
1 Professor Barry J Rodger, The Law School, University of Strathclyde, Glasgow; Many thanks for 
the helpful comments and suggestions on an earlier draft by Jon Lawrence and Alex Malina, 
Freshfields. All errors and omissions remain my responsibility alone. 
2 ^ĞĞ ?ZŽĚŐĞƌ ‘ŽŵƉĞƚŝƚŝŽŶ>Ăǁ>ŝƚŝŐĂƚŝŽŶŝŶƚŚĞ UK Courts: A Study of All Cases to 2004- WĂƌƚ/ ? ? ? ? ? ? ?
>Z ? ? ? ? ‘ŽŵƉĞƚŝƚŝŽŶ>Ăǁ>ŝƚŝŐĂƚŝŽŶŝŶƚŚĞh<ŽƵƌƚƐ P^ƚƵĚǇŽĨůůĂƐĞƐƚŽ2004- WĂƌƚ// ? ? ? ? ? ? ?
>Z ? ? ? ? ‘ŽŵƉĞƚŝƚŝŽŶ>Ăǁ>ŝƚŝŐĂƚŝŽŶŝŶƚŚĞh<ŽƵƌƚƐ P^ƚƵĚǇŽĨůůĂƐĞƐƚŽ ?004- WĂƌƚ/// ? ? ? ? ? ? ?
ECLR 341;  ‘ŽŵƉĞƚŝƚŝŽŶ>Ăǁ>ŝƚŝŐĂƚŝŽŶŝŶƚŚĞh<ŽƵƌƚƐ PĂƐƚƵĚǇŽĨĂůůĐĂƐĞƐ ? ? ? ?-  ? ? ? ?- Parts I and II  
[2009] 2 Global Competition Litigation Review 93-114 and 136- ? ? ?ĂŶĚ ‘ŽŵƉĞƚŝƚŝŽŶ>ĂǁůŝƚŝŐĂƚŝŽŶŝŶ
the UK Courts: A study of all cases 2009- ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?'>Z ? ?-67. 
3 Communication, Strasbourg, 11.6.2013 COM(2013) 401 final. 
4 Commission Recommendation of 11 June 2013 on common principles for injunctive and 
compensatory collective redress mechanisms in the Member States concerning violations of rights 
granted under Union Law OJ L 201, 26.7.2013, pp. 60 ?65. 
5 ^ĞĞ ^ĞĞ  ŶĚƌĞĂŶŐĞůŝ ?  ‘dŚĞ ŚĂŶŐŝŶŐ ƐƚƌƵĐƚƵƌĞ ŽĨ ĐŽŵƉĞƚŝƚŝŽŶ enforcement in the UK: The 
ŽŵƉĞƚŝƚŝŽŶƉƉĞĂůdƌŝďƵŶĂůďĞƚǁĞĞŶƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĐŚĂůůĞŶŐĞƐĂŶĚĂŶƵŶĐĞƌƚĂŝŶĨƵƚƵƌĞ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?: ?-
30; and further infra 
6 ^ĞĞ  ZŽĚŐĞƌ ?  ‘dŚĞ ŽŶƐƵŵĞƌ ZŝŐŚƚƐ Đƚ  ? ? ? ? ĂŶĚ ĐŽůůĞĐƚŝǀ  ƌĞĚƌĞƐƐ ĨŽƌ ĐŽŵƉĞƚŝƚŝŽŶ ůĂǁ
infringements in the h< PĂĐůĂƐƐĐƚ ? ?  ? ? ? ? ? ?  ? ? ? ? :  ? ? ?-286. See for instance Case1257/7/7/16, 
Gibson v Pride Mobility Products Ltd at http://www.catribunal.org.uk/237-9255/1257-7-7-16-
Dorothy-Gibson.html. 
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Furthermore, the adoption of the Antitrust Damages Directive in 2014 after more than a 
decade of policy discussion at the EU level has been the most recent significant legislative 
development. The Directive seeks generally to introduce a set of provisions to establish a 
minimum level playing field of procedural and substantive laws to facilitate the recovery of 
compensation in relation to EU competition law infringements across the EU Member States 
courts. The Damages Directive Statutory Instrument- Claims in respect of Loss or Damage 
arising from Competition Infringements (Competition Act 1998 and other Enactments 
(Amendment) Regulations 2017  ‘ƚŚĞZĞŐƵůĂƚŝŽŶƐ ? ?, the measure implementing the Directive 
in the UK, entered into force on 9 March 2017.7 
The aim of the research undertaken here was to seek to comprehensively identify all 
competition law judgments by the domestic courts of the UK8 between 2013 and 2016 where 
parties were seeking to exercise rights conferred on them either by EU law or domestic UK 
competition law, under Articles 101 and 102 TFEU and the Chapter 1 and 2 prohibitions of the 
Competition Act 1998. A fully comprehensive review of all case-law is not feasible, but key 
case-law highlights will be outlined and discussed, and by looking at these various facets of 
the recent competition case-law we will have a clearer representation of the developing 
nature of private litigation in the UK courts during this period.9 Nonetheless, it should be 
stressed that this research only considers cases where there has been a court judgment, and 
accordingly all competition litigation settlement practice is excluded formally from the report, 
although the author has in recent years sought to identify trends in competition litigation 
settlement practice also in the UK.10  
METHODOLOGY 
In order to identify all competition law cases between private parties in UK courts since 1 Jan 
2013 to end 2016, the Westlaw search engine was used. Searches were undertaken using the 
ƚĞƌŵƐ “ƌƚŝĐůĞ ? ? ? ? ? “ƌƚŝĐůĞ ? ? ? ? ? “ŚĂƉƚĞƌ ?ŽŵƉĞƚŝƚŝŽŶĐƚ ? ? ? ? ? ? “ŚĂƉƚĞƌ ?ŽŵƉĞƚŝƚŝŽŶ
                                                          
7 SI 2017/385. It introduces section 47F and Schedule 8A (Further Provision about claims in respect of 
Loss or Damage before a court or the Tribunal) to the Competition Act 1998. Other provisions will be 
implemented through rules made by Civil procedure Rules Committee, the Scottish Civil Council 
Justice Secretariat, and the NI Court of Judicature Rules Committee, respectively in addition to specific 
rules for the Competition Appeal Tribunal. 
8 It should be emphasised that together with out-of-court settlements, this research does not take 
into account competition-related disputes which are settled through arbitration. See for instance E. 
^ƚǇůŽƉŽƵůŽƐ ‘WŽǁĞƌƐĂŶĚƵƚŝĞƐŽĨƌďŝƚƌĂƚŽƌƐŝŶƚŚĞĂƉƉůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶŽĨĐŽŵƉĞƚŝƚŝŽŶůĂǁ PĂŶĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚ
ŝŶƚŚĞůŝŐŚƚŽĨƌĞĐĞŶƚĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚƐ ? ? ? ? ? ? ?>Z ? ? ? ? 
9 Note that in studies of competition law private enforcement case-law, the author does not include 
case-law which relates to the public enforcement process, and in this period for instance there were 
some interesting related judgments in that category, for instance in Lindum Construction Co v OFT 
[2014] EWHC 1613 (Ch) where the High Court dismissed a restitution claim brought by construction 
companies to recoup some of the penalties imposed on them by the OFT in its 2009 Construction 
decision.  
10 ^ĞĞ  ZŽĚŐĞƌ  ‘WƌŝǀĂƚĞ ŶĨŽƌĐĞŵĞŶƚ ŽĨ ŽŵƉĞƚŝƚŝŽŶ >Ăǁ ? ƚŚĞ,ŝĚĚĞŶ ^ƚŽƌǇ WĂƌƚ // P ŽŵƉĞƚŝƚŝŽŶ
litigation Settlements in the UK 2008- ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?'>Z ? ?- 108. 
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Đƚ  ? ? ? ? ? ? ƚŽŐĞƚŚĞƌ ǁŝƚŚ  “Ɛ ? ? ? Žmpetition Act 1998. The website of the Competition 
Appeal Tribunal was also consulted. Some competition law cases fail on a procedural issue or 
because of some other technical or legal hurdle and not simply because they have failed to 
establish the substantive competition law claim or defence to the requisite standard, but we 
considered it crucial to consider the purported application of competition law rights in a 
comprehensive manner. Much of the recent focus at European and UK level has simply been 
on private damages actions.11 Whilst these are very important, and attract the highest public 
profile, it is important to recognise that competition law may also be used as a shield and that 
damages are not always an appropriate remedy for a competition law claimant. Moreover, it 
would provide merely a partial insight into competition litigation practice if one were only to 
consider and assess competition law rulings on the substance or merits after a trial (proof). 
This would ignore the wider legal framework in which competition law claims and defences 
may be successfully made and the context in which they are facilitated or obstructed.  
Accordingly, the research extends to all cases where competition law has been pled and relied 
on by either party, even where the ruling or judgment has not focused on the merits of the 
competition law issue itself, but may have determined a procedural aspect of the case.  
NUMBER OF COMPETITION LAW CASES 
There have been 58 judgments overall in the relevant period, in 30 separate disputes, as there 
have been judgments on relation to different aspects of the same dispute in some cases. 
Some cases, particularly through the CAT avenue, have been sagas with multiple judgments 
on various issues. 
Earlier studies observed a steady level of cases between the years 1999-2009, with a peak in 
2008 and a noticeable increase in the years 2010 and 2011 (14 and 16 respectively).12 
Although there is no clear pattern in the years 2013 -2015 (with 19, 7 and 8 judgments 
respectively) 2016 has witnessed a considerable increase in case-law activity with 24 
judgments in total. Over the 4 year period there have been 26 CAT judgments (and of course 
appeals from CAT rulings to the Court of Appeal and Supreme Court) but in 2016 15 of the 24 
judgments were by the CAT. The increase, and the increasing role of the CAT is likely to reflect 
the changes introduced by the Consumer Rights Act  ? ? ? ? ?ĞǆƚĞŶĚŝŶŐƚŚĞƐĐŽƉĞŽĨƚŚĞd ?Ɛ
jurisdiction and limiting the significance of the distinction between stand-alone and follow-
on actions in that context at least.  
CASE-LAW DISCUSSION 
We considered the competition case-law in four categories according to different stages of 
the litigation process. dŚĞĨŝŶĂůĐĂƚĞŐŽƌǇŝƐĚĞŶŽƚĞĚďǇƚŚĞďƌŽĂĚďĂŶŶĞƌŽĨ ‘ŝŶƚĞƌŝŵƉƌŽĐĞƐƐ ?
which covers a range of situations in which judgments are given in a competition law dispute 
                                                          
11 See for instance J-& >ĂďŽƌĚĞ  ‘ĂƌƚĞů ĂŵĂŐĞƐ ůĂŝŵƐ ŝŶ ƵƌŽƉĞ P ,Žǁ ŽƵƌƚƐŚĂǀĞ ĂƐƐĞƐƐĞĚ
ŽǀĞƌĐŚĂƌŐĞƐ ?ŽŶĐƵƌƌĞŶĐĞƐEŽ ?-2017, 36-42.  
12 With 7 to 1 May 2012 continuing this trend. 
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during the procedural phases of the litigation, and can be very significant, for instance in 
relation to disclosure or limitation.13 The second category involves cases where the defendant 
or the claimant has sought a summary judgment in order to dismiss the action or to strike out 
the defence.14 The third set of case-law involves a substantive final judgment on the 
competition law issue, normally following trial.15 Inevitably these cases have generally 
attracted greatest public profile and interest, and perhaps not surprisingly they are relatively 
rare, reflecting partly the low success rate generally, the prevalence of settlements and the 
limited development of mechanisms to enhance the attraction of private competition law 
enforcement. There have only been 4 such rulings in this period. The final category are 
judgments in relation to follow-on damages actions awards, of which there has only been one 
by the CAT during the period 2013-2016 in Albion water Limited v Dwr Cymru Cyfngedig.16 
 
Interim Process- Procedural issues 
CAT OR HIGH COURT? 
The first set of procedural issues tackled in this period concerns the respective roles of the 
courts (the High Court) and CAT, raising questions about specialism, the application of s 16 of 
the Enterprise Act, allowing for transfer of cases, and the scope of the special provision in 
s47A of the Competition Act 1998. 
 
The Consumer Rights Act 2015 has made various amendments to the Competition Act regime, 
as of 1st October 2015, to enhance the role of the CAT as the specialist forum for competition 
law disputes in the UK.17 As noted above, it introduced a new model for collective redress, 
and in 2016 two collective actions were raised under these new provisions, in relation to 
mobility scooters and Mastercard respectively.18 A central aspect of the reform was the 
extension of the competence of the CAT under section 47A of the Competition to standalone 
                                                          
13 And some judgments in this category are closely related to the summary judgment category, for 
instance where a party seeks to amend to include a competition law defence or claim. 
14 Note there are some potential overlaps here with the interim process cases. 
15 Or proof as it is known in Scots law. 
16 8 March 2013  Case 1166/5/7/10 Albion water Limited v Dwr Cymru Cyfngedig, [2013] CAT 6 
17 ^ĞĞŶĚƌĞĂŶŐĞůŝ ? ‘dŚĞŚĂŶŐŝŶŐƐƚƌƵĐƚƵƌĞŽĨĐŽŵƉĞƚŝƚŝŽŶĞŶĨŽƌĐĞŵĞŶƚŝŶƚŚĞh< PdŚĞŽŵƉĞƚŝƚŝŽŶ
ƉƉĞĂů dƌŝďƵŶĂů ďĞƚǁĞĞŶ ƉƌĞƐĞŶƚ ĐŚĂůůĞŶŐĞƐ ĂŶĚ ĂŶ ƵŶĐĞƌƚĂŝŶ ĨƵƚƵƌĞ ?  ? ? ? ? ? ?  ? ? ? ? :  ?-30; A 
RobertsoŶ ‘h<ŽŵƉĞƚŝƚŝŽŶ>ŝƚŝŐĂƚŝŽŶ P&ƌŽŵŝŶĚĞƌĞůůĂƚŽ'ŽůĚŝůŽĐŬƐ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?ŽŵƉĞƚŝƚŝŽŶ>Ăǁ:ŽƵƌŶĂů
275.  A number of claims have already been raised before the CAT under these new provisions, see 
http://www.catribunal.org.uk/237/all/2/Cases.html. See for instance the fast-track claim raised at the 
CAT for damages in relation to Polyurethane foam, instituted on 7/4/2016 in Breasley Pillows Limited 
and others v Vita Cellular Foams (UK) Limited and another, Case 1250/5/7/16. 
18 See Case 1257/7/16, Dorothy Gibson v Pride Mobility Products Ltd, ĂŶĚƚŚĞd ?ƐƌƵůŝŶŐŝŶƚŚŝƐĐĂƐĞ
on 31 March 2017, CAT [2017] 9 and the subsequent withdrawal of the claim ordered by the CAT on 
25 May 2017, http://www.catribunal.org.uk/237-9255/1257-7-7-16-Dorothy-Gibson.html; and 
Walter Hugh Merricks v Mastercard Inc at http://www.catribunal.org.uk/237-9391/1266-7-7-16--
Walter-Hugh-Merricks-CBE-.html. 
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actions in additiŽŶƚŽ ‘ĨŽůůŽǁ-ŽŶ ?ĂĐƚŝŽŶƐǁŚĞƌĞƚŚĞƌĞŝƐĂƉƌŝŽƌŝŶĨƌŝŶŐĞŵĞŶƚĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶ ?19 This 
will mean that claimants will not have to wait until an infringement decision by the CMA or 
Commission becomes final before raising an action before the CAT, or alternatively raise an 
action at the High Court.20 Furthermore, the CAT now has power (at least in proceedings in 
England and Wales and Northern Ireland) to grant injunctions.21  A fast-track procedure has 
also been introduced before the CAT, although in Breasley Pillows Limited and others v Vita 
Cellular Foams (UK) ltd and others the CAT dismissed an application for fast-track proceedings 
under Rule 58 on a number of grounds, notably the complexity of the case, length of the final 
hearing and the lack of urgency.22 
 
The existence, composition and functions allocated to a specialist competition court or 
tribunal are clearly major factors in the institutional design of a legal system to deal with 
competition litigation, and there has been a proliferation of specialist competition tribunals 
across jurisdictions worldwide over the last twenty years.23 Nonetheless as Roth has stressed, 
the degree of specialism required is partly dependent on the role and functions to be 
performed by the particular court or tribunal. Roth notes that a key disadvantage in the 
ĐŽŵƉĞƚŝƚŝŽŶůĂǁĐŽŶƚĞǆƚĐŽŶĐĞƌŶƐƉŽƚĞŶƚŝĂů ‘ũƵƌŝƐĚŝĐƚŝŽŶĂůĚŝƐƉƵƚĞƐƌĞŐĂƌĚŝŶŐƚŚĞďŽƵŶĚĂƌǇ ?24 
which largely depends on how the specialist ĐŽƵƌƚ ?ƐũƵƌŝƐĚŝĐƚŝŽŶŝƐƐĞƚŽƵƚ ?25 a recurrent theme 
in much of the early litigation following the Enterprise Act 2002. 
 
One of the many rulings in this 2013-2016 period involving claims against Mastercard in 
relation to its MIF arrangements, involved this issue of the appropriate forum for trial:- in 
Sainsbury's Supermarkets Limited v Mastercard Incorporated, Mastercard International 
                                                          
19 ^ĞĐƚŝŽŶ  ? ?  ? ? ? ĞǆƚĞŶĚƐ ƚŚĞ ĐŽŵƉĞƚĞŶĐĞ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ d ƚŽ ĚĞĂů ǁŝƚŚ ĐůĂŝŵƐ ŝŶǀŽůǀŝŶŐ  ‘ĂůůĞŐĞĚ
ŝŶĨƌŝŶŐĞŵĞŶƚƐ ? ?
20 ^ĞĞWŬŵĂŶ ‘WĞƌŝŽĚŽĨ>ŝŵŝƚĂƚŝŽŶƐŝŶĨŽůůŽǁ-ŽŶĐŽŵƉĞƚŝƚŝŽŶĐĂƐĞƐ PǁŚĞŶĚŽĞƐĂ ‘ĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶďĞĐŽŵĞ
ĨŝŶĂů ? ?  ? ? ? ? ? ?  ? ? ? ? :  ? ? ?-421, although note the Consumer Act 2015 revisions do not make any 
provision as to  when an infringement decision becomes final for the purposes of the running of the 
limitation periods, as revised.  Moreover, it should be noted that as a result of Rule 119 of the revised 
CAT rules (The Competition Appeal Tribunal Rules 2015, SI 2015/1648), the old Competition Act 
provisions and Tribunal rules on limitation of actions (and the suspensive effect of appeal proceedings) 
will continue to apply to all claims (including in collective proceedings) to which section 47A applies 
where the claim arises before 1 October 2015. See 
http://competitionbulletin.com/2015/10/01/private-actions-the-cra-2015-giveth-and-the-2015-cat-
rules-taketh-away/. See Gibson v Pride Mobility Products Ltd [2017] CAT 9. 
21 Section 47A(3). There is also provision for a fast-track procedure in para 31 of Schedule 8 to the 
2015 Act. 
22 7 June 2016 Case 1250/5/7/16 [2016] CAT 8. 
23 ^ĞĞZŽĚŐĞƌ ‘/ŶƚƌŽĚƵĐƚŝŽŶ ? ?Ɖ ? ?ŝŶZŽĚŐĞƌ ?ĞĚ ? ?Landmark Cases in Competition Law: around the 
World in Fourteen Stories, Kluwer Law International, 2011. In the UK context see D BaiůĞǇ ? ‘ĂƌůǇĂƐĞ-
Law of the Competition Apeal tribunal, Ch 2 in B Rodger (ed) Ten years of UK Competition Law Reform, 
hW ? ? ? ? ? ?^ĞĞ ?^^ĂǀƌŝŶ ‘^ƉĞĐŝĂůŝǌĞĚŶƚŝƚƌƵƐƚŽƵƌƚƐ PWƌĂĐƚŝƚŝŽŶĞƌ ?ƐKďƐĞƌǀĂƚŝŽŶƐ ?ŚĂƉƚĞƌ ? ?Ăƚ
pp116- ? ? ? ĂŶĚ W ? ZŽƚŚ  ‘^ƉĞĐŝĂůŝǌĞĚ ŶƚŝƚƌƵƐƚ ŽƵƌƚƐ ? ĂƉƚĞƌ  ? ? Ɖ ? ? ? ? ďŽƚŚ ŝŶ  ,ĂǁŬ  ?ĞĚ ?Annual 
Proceedings of the Fordham Competition Law Institute, (2013: Fordham Competition Law Institute).  
24 Roth supra at 108. 
25 This problem has been clearly evidenced by practice before the CAT and the reforms introduced by 
the Consumer Rights Act 2015. Note also the related problem concerning claims also involving other 
non-competition issues (see Roth supra at 109).  
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Incorporated, Mastercard Europe S.P.R.L.,26 whereby the High Court transferred the damages 
action to the CAT under s 16 of the Enterprise Act and the s 16 Enterprise Act Regulations 
2015.27 Prior to the Enterprise Act 2015 the Cat did not have jurisdiction to hear a standalone 
claim for damages. The 2015 Regulations allowed the High Court to transfer cases to the CAT 
for ŝƚƐĚĞƚĞƌŵŝŶĂƚŝŽŶ ‘ƐŽŵƵĐŚŽĨĂŶǇƉƌŽĐĞĞĚŝŶŐƐĂƐƌĞůĂƚĞƐƚŽan infringement issue ?.28 The 
AĐƚĚĞĨŝŶĞĚŝŶĨƌŝŶŐĞŵĞŶƚŝƐƐƵĞĂƐ ‘ĂŶǇƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶƌĞůĂƚŝŶŐƚŽǁŚĞƚŚĞƌŽƌŶŽƚĂŶŝŶĨƌŝŶŐĞŵĞŶƚŽĨ
 ?Ă ? ƚŚĞ ŚĂƉƚĞƌ / ƉƌŽŚŝďŝƚŝŽŶ ? ? Kƌ  ?ď ? ƌƚŝĐůĞ  ? ? ? ? ŽĨ ƚŚĞ dƌĞĂƚǇ Śas been or is being 
ĐŽŵŵŝƚƚĞĚ ? It was agreed that given the level of expert evidence it was suitable for transfer 
to the CAT despite the advanced stage of proceedings, partly given that Barling J would also 
be the trial judge at the CAT. It was held, taking into account the parties wishes, that such a 
transfer was appropriate, noting for instance the specialist nature of the CAT and in particular 
ƚŚĞ  ‘ŽƵƚƐtanding logistical and legal support provided by the CAT staff and legal assistants 
 ?ƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĚĂŝƌĞƐ ? ? ?dŚŝƐŝƐŽĨƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌǀĂůƵĞŝŶůĞŶŐƚŚǇĂŶĚĐŽŵƉůĞǆĂĐƚions. ?29  
 
There was also a ruling in relation to security for costs where the competition law issues had 
been transferred to the CAT under s16 in Agents' Mutual Limited v Gascoigne Halman Limited 
(T/A Gascoigne Halman).30 The question of the scope of s47A of the 1998 Act31 was 
considered by the Court of Appeal in 2013 in WH Newson Holding Ltd v IMI Plc,32 Under s 47A 
of the 1998 Act,33 damages and other monetary awards could be awarded by the CAT or 
ordinary civil courts where there was already been a finding by the relevant authorities of an 
infringement of the Chapters I and II prohibitions, or Arts 101 or 102 TFEU.34 Nonetheless, in 
this case the Court of Appeal accepted that claims may be based under section 47A on the 
tort of conspiracy to use unlawful means.35 However, the Appeal Court stressed that given 
intent to injure was an essential component of the tort of conspiracy to injure, that element 
would require to be clearly established in the findings of the infringement decision. 
Accordingly the trial judge had erred in holding that one of the conspiracy claims could 
                                                          
26 30 November 2015, [2015] EWHC 3472 (Ch). 
27 2015/1643. 
28 s 16(6) of the Enterprise Act 2002. See also Unwired Planet International Ltd v Huawei Technologies 
Co Ltd, also known as:  Unwired Planet Inc v Samsung Electronics Co Ltd, 27 May 2016, CA, [2016] 
EWCA Civ 489; [2016] 5 C.M.L.R. 11, where Mr Justice Birss rejected an application by Samsung to 
transfer the competition law aspects of the Unwired Planet case to the CAT. This was on the basis that 
contractual FRAND issues in tŚĞ ĐĂƐĞ ǁĞƌĞ ŶŽƚ  “ŝŶĨƌŝŶŐĞŵĞŶƚ ŝƐƐƵĞƐ ? ĂŶĚ ƚŚƵƐ ŝŶĐĂƉĂďůĞ ŽĨ ďĞŝŶŐ
transferred  W therefore, a transfer of the competition law aspects of the claim would render the case 
split in a way that would create an impractical and confusing division in the handling and decision 
making process. 
29 At para 16. 
30 14 September 2016, [2016] EWHC 2315 (Ch). 
31 Prior to its revision by the Consumer Rights Act 2015 Act as outlined supra. 
32 Court of Appeal (Civil Division) 12 November 2013, [2013] EWCA Civ 1377; [2014] 1 All E.R. 1132. 
33 As introduced by s 18 of the Enterprise Act. 
34 ^ĞĞD&ƵƌƐĞ  ‘&ŽůůŽǁ-KŶĂĐƚŝŽŶƐ ŝŶ ƚŚĞh< ?>ŝƚŝŐĂƚŝŶŐ^ĞĐƚŝŽŶ  ? ?ŽĨ ƚŚĞŽŵƉĞƚŝƚŝŽŶĐƚ  ? ? ? ? ?
(2013) European Competition Journal 9(1) 79-103. 
35 See WH Newson Holding ltd v IMI Plc  ? ? ? ? ? ?tŝǀ ? ? ? ? ?ĂŶĚ>ŝŶŐƐĚĂůĞ ‘ƌŽĂĚĞŶŝŶŐƚŚĞ^ĐŽƉĞ
for follow-on damages under the Competition Act- WH Newson Ltd v IMI plc (2014) Comp. L. J. 103-
106. This may be more significant following the changes to the competence of the Competition Appeal 
Tribunal, following the introduction of the Consumer Rights Act, discussed supra. See also C A Banfi 
 ‘ĞĨŝŶŝŶŐƚŚĞŽŵƉĞƚŝƚŝŽŶdŽƌƚƐĂƐhŶůĂǁĨƵůtƌŽŶŐƐ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?ĂŵďƌŝĚŐĞ>Ăǁ:ŽƵƌŶĂů ? ?-112 
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ĐŽŶƚŝŶƵĞǁŚĞŶƚŚŝƐĞůĞŵĞŶƚǁĂƐůĂĐŬŝŶŐŝŶƚŚĞŽŵŵŝƐƐŝŽŶ ?ƐĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶŝŶƚŚĞĐĂƌƚĞůĐŽŶĐĞƌŶŝŶŐ
the supply of copper plumbing pipes.36  
 
Historically, a key dilemma for national courts has been the interplay between private 
litigation with EU proceedings and how to deal with ongoing cases by the EU authorities in 
order to avoid potentially conflicting decisions being taken by the national courts. There have 
been various cases on this issue in the period, including , Infederation Ltd v Google Inc37 and 
National Grid Electricity Transmission plc v ABB ltd.38 Article 16 of Regulation 1/2003, in 
relation to the effect of Commission decisions on all EU national courts, provides as follows:- 
 ‘ ? ?tŚĞŶŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůĐŽƵƌƚƐrule on agreements, decisions or practices under Article [101] or 
Article [102] of the Treaty which are already the subject of a Commission decision, they 
ĐĂŶŶŽƚƚĂŬĞĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶƐƌƵŶŶŝŶŐĐŽƵŶƚĞƌƚŽƚŚĞĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶĂĚŽƉƚĞĚďǇƚŚĞŽŵŵŝƐƐŝŽŶ ? ?dŚŝƐŝƐĂ
 ‘ůĞŐŝƐůĂƚŝǀĞƌĞĐŽŐŶŝƚŝŽŶ ?39 ŽĨƚŚĞ: ?ƐĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶŝŶMasterfoods.40 There are limits to the scope 
of the Masterfoods/Article 16 consistency requirement, as demonstrated by the House of 
Lords in its 2007 ruling in Crehan v Inntrepreneur Pub co,41 where the court is not necessarily 
dealing with the same parties or markets as the earlier Commission decision. Moroever, as 
Justice Roth made clear in National Grid Electricity transmission plc v ABB ltd,42 there is a 
 ‘ĨƵŶĚĂŵĞŶƚĂů ĚŝƐƚŝŶĐƚŝŽŶ ? ďĞƚǁĞĞŶ ŝŶĐŽnsistency with a prior Commission decision, and 
claims which seek to elaborate on the findings of the Decision as to how the cartel worked in 
practice.43 As he stressed, outside the limited confines of the old s47A mechanism, the term 
 ‘ĨŽůůŽǁ-ŽŶĂĐƚŝŽŶ ?ŝƐŶŽƚĂ  ‘ƚĞƌŵŽĨĂƌƚ ?ĂŶĚŽŵŵŝƐƐŝŽŶĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶƐƌĂƌĞůǇƉƌŽǀŝĚĞĂĚĞƚĂŝůĞĚ
 ‘ĞůĂďŽƌĂƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ĐŽŶƐĞƋƵĞŶĐĞƐ ? ŽĨ Ă ĐĂƌƚĞů ?44 Article 16 of Regulation 1 also applies to 
standalone actions where there is as yet no Commission decision, but the possibility of such 
an infringement decision being issued in future.45 Infederation Ltd v Google Inc confirmed that 
in such cases, the proceedings may continue to a point before actual decision or judgment,46 
and ŝƚŝƐŝŶƚŚĞĐŽƵƌƚ ?ƐĚŝƐĐƌĞƚŝŽŶǁŚĂƚƐƚĞƉƐŵĂǇďĞƚĂŬĞŶŝŶƚŚĞƉƌŽceedings,47 such discretion 
to be exercised having regard to the requirement to avoid a decision that is counter to the 
                                                          
36 OJ L 192, 13.7.2006, p. 21 ?29. See also Iiyama Benelux Bv v Schott AG, 23 May 2016, [2016 5 
CMLR 15, (Ch), discussed further infra in relation to the territorial scope of the EU competition 
law rules. 
37 Also known as: Infederation Ltd v Google Ireland Ltd 26 July 2013, [2013] EWHC 2295 (Ch); [2014] 1 
All E.R. 325; [2014] 1 C.M.L.R. 13. 
38 [2014] EWHC 1055 (Ch). 
39 Per Floyd J at par 24 of Conex Banninger Ltd v the European Commission [2010] EWHC 1978 (Ch). 
40 Case C-344/98 Masterfoods v HB [2000] ECR I-11369. See also the earlier judgment by Laddie J at 
para 69 in Iberian UK Limited v BPB Industries [1996] 2 CMLR 601. 
41 [2007] 1 A.C. 333, HL. 
42 6 May 2014, [2014] EWHC 1055 (Ch). 
43 At para 27.  
44 Ibid at para 26 and 27. See for instance Cooper Tire & Rubber Co v Shell Chemicals UK Ltd [2010] 
EWCA Civ 864, CA. See also more recently, Nokia Corporation v AU Optonics Corporation and others 
[2012] EWHC 732 (Ch) and Toshiba Carrier UK Ltd and others v KME Yorkshire Ltd and others [2011] 
EWHC 2665 (Ch); [2012] EWCA Civ 1190. See also the discussion in Bord Na Mona Horticulture Ltd v 
British polythene Industries plc [2012] EWHC 3346 (Comm) paras 38-42. 
45 See for instance Infederation ltd v Google Inc [2013] EWHC 2295 (Ch), particularly at para. 25. 
46 MTV Europe v BMG records (Uk) Ltd [1997] 1 CMLR 867 per Bingham MR at para 29. 
47 Morgan Stanley Dean Witter Bank ltd v Visa International Services Association [2001] All ER (D). 
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Commission or the EU courts.48 The same principles were considered and applied in Wm 
Morrison Supermarkets Plc v MasterCard Inc,49 where the court declined to stay proceedings 
pending the outcome of an appeal to the ECJ.  
 
DISCLOSURE 
There have been a tranche of cases during the period concerning disclosure, a key factor in 
competition litigation. Of course, the EU Antitrust Damages Directive was at least partly 
introduced with the purpose of facilitating the task of potential claimants in proving their 
competition law claims. Accordingly, Article 5(1) provides that where a claimant provides a 
 ‘ƌĞĂƐŽŶĞĚ ũƵƐƚŝĨŝĐĂƚŝŽŶ ? ?50 national courts shall order disclosure of relevant evidence within 
their control by the defendant or a third party.51 Member States shall ensure that national 
courts are able, upon request of the defendant, to order the claimant or a third party to 
disclose relevant evidence.52 Nonetheless, this provision in the Directive was aimed primarily 
at those Member States with limited provision for pre-trial disclosure and is unlikely to have 
any impact on the existing provision in the legal systems within the UK.53 
 
In England and Wales the Civil Procedure Rules mandate that a party must disclose all 
documents which are relevant to the litigation, including those that harm its own case or 
ƐƵƉƉŽƌƚƚŚĞŽƉƉŽƐŝŶŐƉĂƌƚǇ ?ƐĐĂƐĞ ?54 Standard disclosure in the High Court takes place when 
pleadings are well-advanced.55 Although it is clear that disclosure is considerably broader than 
across most legal systems in continental Europe,56 there are limits on pre-trial disclosure.57 In 
WH Newson Holding Ltd v IMI plc,58 it was held that the claimants in complex litigation arising 
out of the copper plumbing tubes cartel under s47A of the 1998 Act which had been 
transferred to the High Court were entitled, when bringing a contribution claim against a third 
party, to disclosure by the addressees of a Commission infringement decision to ascertain if 
                                                          
48 See National Grid Electricity Transmission plc v ABB Ltd [2009] EWHC 1326 (Ch) and Wm Morrison 
Supermarkets plc v Mastercard Inc [2013] EWHC 1071 (Comm). 
49  11 October 2013 (2013) EWHC 3082 (Comm). See also earlier ruling in the same case on 3rd May 
2013, [2013] EWHC 1071 (Comm). 
50  ? ‘ĐŽŶƚĂŝŶŝŶŐƌĞĂƐŽŶĂďůǇĂǀĂŝůĂďůĞĨĂĐƚƐĂŶĚĞǀŝĚĞŶĐĞƐƵĨĨŝĐŝĞŶƚƚŽƐƵƉƉŽƌƚƚŚĞƉůĂƵƐŝďŝůŝƚǇŽĨŝƚƐĐůĂŝŵ
ĨŽƌĚĂŵĂŐĞƐ ?ƉĞƌƌƚŝĐůĞ ? ? ? ?ŽĨƚŚĞŝƌĞĐƚŝǀĞ ? 
51 Article 5(1) also makes provision for a defendant or third party to seek disclosure from the claimant 
in a damages action. 
52 Article 5(2) ensures that courts can order disclosure of items or categories of evidence where 
 ‘ĐŝƌĐƵŵƐĐƌŝďĞĚĂƐƉƌĞĐŝƐĞůǇĂŶĚĂƐŶĂƌƌŽǁůǇĂƐƉŽƐƐŝďůĞ ? ?ƐƵďũĞĐƚƚŽĂƉƌŽƉŽƌƚŝŽŶĂůŝƚǇƚĞƐƚĂƐƐĞƚŽƵƚŝŶ
Article 5(3) and the rules on professional legal privilege (article 5(6)). Note that subject to certain 
prescribed limitations, Article 6 ensures that disclosure also applies to evidence included in the file of 
a competition authority. 
53 B Rodger (ed) Competition Law Comparative Private Enforcement and Collective Redress Across the 
EU (2014 Kluwer Law International) chapter 2. 
54 Civil Procedure Rules Part 31; in particular Part 31.6(b). See Rules 60-65 of the Competition Appeal 
Tribunal Rules 2015.   
55 There is also the possibility of specific disclosure where appropriate. The process is known as 
 ‘ƌĞĐŽǀĞƌǇ ?ŝŶ^ĐŽƚƐůĂǁ ? 
56 ^ĞĞĨŽƌŝŶƐƚĂŶĐĞW'ƵŝĚŝĐŝ ? ‘WƌŝǀĂƚĞŶƚŝƚƌƵƐƚůĂǁŶĨŽƌĐĞŵĞŶƚŝŶ/ƚĂůǇ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?ŽŵƉ ?> ?ZĞǀ ? ? ? 
57 See Hutchison 3G UK ltd v O2 (UK) Ltd [2008] EWHC 50 (Comm). See also Rule 18 of the Civil 
Procedure rules. 
58 4 December 2013, [2013] EWHC 3788 (Ch). 
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there was evidence of the third party involvement in the cartel.59 There was a ruling on 
disclosure in 2014, as one of various rulings in the National Grid Electricity Transmission Plc v 
ABB Ltd60 case following the supply of gas insulated switchgear cartel. The applicant, the 
owner of the UK electricity system, sought further information under CPR Pt 18 from various 
companies about how the cartel had operated in the UK market. It was argued that this 
information went beyond the infringement and ran contrary to the adversarial system at the 
heart of the English legal system. The application was granted in part where the requests were 
reasonable and proportionate and were necessary to understand how the infringement found 
by the Commission had actually operated in the UK and where the potentially relevant 
information was in the knowledge of only one side in the litigation, emphasising the 
importance of disclosure to equality of arms in the competition litigation context. 
 
The 2015 Court of Appeal ruling in Emerald Supplies Ltd v British Airways Plc,61 concerned two 
important legal points, including a disclosure related issue, in a claim by air cargo shippers 
that BA had operated an illegal world-wide cartel to fix prices for freight services, following 
an infringement decision by the European Commission.62 The Commission decision had 
mentioned other parties without identifying them as infringers. The claimants unsuccessfully 
sought access to the unredacted version of the decision ŝŶĐůƵĚŝŶŐƚŚĞ ‘WĞƌŐĂŶŵĂƚĞƌŝĂů ? ?which 
described conduct by other parties which may be characterised as infringing art 101 but which 
could not be challenged before the European courts. The court followed the established 
principles set out by the European court in Pergan, in stressing the importance of the 
presumption of innocence.63  
 
A second ruling in the Infederation Ltd v Google Inc64 dispute also concerned disclosure. This 
was a case relating to the ongoing European investigation into the alleged abusive activities 
by Google, stemming from a complaint by Foundem. In the English court proceedings, the 
claimant sought permission to disclose in European proceedings a document analysing the 
ĚĞĨĞŶĚĂŶƚ ?ƐĚŝƐĐůŽƐĞĚĚŽĐƵŵĞŶƚƐ which had been produced in the English proceedings. Given 
there was no evidence to suggest the claimant had instituted the English court proceedings 
ĨŽƌĂŶŝŵƉƌŽƉĞƌƉƵƌƉŽƐĞŽƌƚŽŐĂŝŶĂŶĂĚǀĂŶƚĂŐĞŝŶƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƚŽƚŚĞŽŵŵŝƐƐŝŽŶ ?ƐƉƌŽĐĞĞĚŝŶŐƐ ?
it was appropriate to grant permission under CPR r31.22(1)(b) and this would also further the 
important public policy that the domestic proceedings should be consistent with the 
European proceedings.65 
 
LIMITATION 
As discussed elsewhere, probably the most significant procedural issue in practice, as 
evidenced by the considerable litigation, concerns the application of the limitation rules in 
                                                          
59 The High Court was not limited by s47A to claims only against the companies that were addresses 
of the infringement relied upon.  
60 6 May 2014, [2014] EWHC 1055 (Ch). 
61 14 October 2015, [2015] EWCA Civ 1024. 
62  See 2017 re-adopted decision, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-661_en.htm. 
63 CaseT-474/04 Pergan Hilfstoffe fur Industrielle Prozesse v Commission, [2007] E.C.R. II-4225. 
64 17 December 2015, [2015] EWHC 3705 (Ch). 
65 Note also two other subsequent 2017 rulings on disclosure issues in 26 January 2017 Case 
1248/5/7/16 Peugeot SA and others v NSK ltd and others [2017] CAT 2; and 27 January 2017 Case 
1262/5/7/16 (T) ŐĞŶƚƐ ?DƵƚƵĂů>ƚĚǀ'ĂƐĐŽŝŐŶĞ,ĂůŵĂŶ>ƚĚ ?ƚ ?Ă'ĂƐĐŽŝŐŶĞ,ĂůŵĂŶ ? [2017] CAT 3. 
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the competition law context.66  Until the Consumer Rights Act 2015 reforms, the limitation 
rules before the CAT were distinctive from the 6 year limitation period for High Court claims, 
and dependent on the post-infringement appeal process. There have been various judgments 
focused directly on time-bar issues by the CAT. In Deutsche Bahn AG v Morgan crucible 
Company Plc and others,67 the Appeal Court, overruling the CAT, held that the limitation 
period was suspended vis-a-vis a non-appealing addressee of a Commission decision. 
However, in 2014 the Supreme Court68 ruled that a Commission Decision establishing 
infringement of article 81 (now article 101) constituted in law a series of individual decisions 
addressed to its individual addressees. Accordingly, the only relevant decision establishing 
infringement in relation to an addressee who does not appeal is the original Commission 
Decision, and therefore any appeal against the finding of infringement by any other party is 
irrelevant to a non-appealing defendant. Under section 47A(5), the date of the relevant 
infringement decision was the date of the Commission decision and therefore the follow-on 
ĐůĂŝŵ ĨŽƌ Đŝǀŝů ĚĂŵĂŐĞƐ ǁĂƐ ŽƵƚ ŽĨ ƚŝŵĞ ? dŚĞ ĂƉƉĞĂů ǁĂƐ ĂůůŽǁĞĚ ? ƚŚĞ ŽƵƌƚ ŽĨ ƉƉĞĂů ?Ɛ
ũƵĚŐŵĞŶƚƐĞƚĂƐŝĚĞ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞd ?ƐũƵĚŐŵĞŶƚƐƚƌŝŬŝŶŐŽƵƚƚŚĞƌĞƐƉŽŶĚĞŶƚƐ ?ĐůĂŝŵƌĞƐƚŽƌĞĚ ?dŚĞ
Supreme Court ruling is consistent with EU law but may encourage follow-on actions (before 
the CAT or High Court) while the underlying infringement issues are being appealed, although 
one would anticipate such proceedings to be stayed or a reference to be made to the 
European Court under Article 267 (in line with Article 16 of Regulation 1/2003) pending 
European Court appeal processes being finalised. As Akman has indicated, although this 
problem is relevant for all cartel proceedings involving multiple infringers, it may have 
particularly deleterious consequences for leniency recipients and for the overall balance 
between public and private enforcement.69  
 
With the exception of personal injury cases, English law generally allows for a 6 year limitation 
period.70 In 2013, in one of many rulings involving Mastercard, Wm Morrison Supermarkets 
Plc v MasterCard Inc,71 an amendment was allowed to plead a new claim on the basis that the 
claim could only be made for the 6 year limitation period prior to the judgment. This was 
allowed to avoid the unnecessary costs in requiring the claimant to bring a separate claim and 
then seek to consolidate it with the existing action. 
  
There is special provision for postponement of the limitation period in case of fraud, 
concealment or mistake under 32 of the Limitation Act 1980. In relation to secretive cartels 
ŝŶƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌ ?Ɛ ? ? ? ? ? ?ď ?ŚĂƐƉŽƚĞŶƚŝĂůƌĞůĞǀĂŶĐĞǁŚĞƌĞ ‘ĂŶǇĨĂĐƚƌĞůĞǀĂŶƚƚŽƚŚĞƉůĂŝŶƚŝĨĨ ?ƐƌŝŐŚƚ
ŽĨĂĐƚŝŽŶŚĂƐďĞĞŶĚĞůŝďĞƌĂƚĞůǇĐŽŶĐĞĂůĞĚĨƌŽŵŚŝŵďǇƚŚĞĚĞĨĞŶĚĂŶƚ ? ?/ŶƐƵĐŚĐĂƐĞs, the time 
                                                          
66 ^ĞĞZŽĚŐĞƌ ? ‘/ŵƉůĞŵĞŶƚĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞŶƚŝƚƌƵƐƚĂŵĂŐĞƐŝƌĞĐƚŝǀĞŝŶƚŚĞh< PůŝŵŝƚĞĚƌĞĨŽƌŵŽĨƚŚĞ
limitation ruleƐ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?>Z ? ? ?-227. 
67 [2012] EWCA Civ 1055. See the earlier CAT ruling at [2011] CAT 16 . 
689 April 2014, Deutsche Bahn AG and others v Morgan Advanced Materials Plc (formerly Morgan 
Crucible Co Plc) [2014] UKSC 24 On appeal from: [2012] EWCA Civ 1055.  
69 WŬŵĂŶ ‘WĞƌŝŽĚŽĨ>ŝŵŝƚĂƚŝŽŶƐŝŶĨŽůůŽǁ-ŽŶĐŽŵƉĞƚŝƚŝŽŶĐĂƐĞƐ PǁŚĞŶĚŽĞƐĂ ‘ĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶďĞĐŽŵĞĨŝŶĂů ? ?
(2014) 2(2) JAE 389-421. 
70 Limitation Act 1980 s2.  
71 08 October 2013, [2013] EWHC 3271 (Comm). 
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limit will not run until the claimant has discovered the concealment or could have done so 
with reasonable diligence.72   
 
Of course, for claims arising since 1 October 2015, the Consumer Rights Act revised the 
limitation regime, and section 47E of the Competition At effectively applies the same rules in 
the CAT as before the High Court. However, for claims arising before 1 October 2015, there 
are transitional provisions in the much-maligned 2015 Tribunal Rules 119(2)-(4).73 Yet another 
of the rulings in this period involved Mastercard and consideration of the transitional 
limitation regime, in Deutsche Bahn AG and others v Mastercard Inc and others74 where the 
claim arose before but was raised after 1 October 2015. Ultimately the CAT dismissed the 
defence claim under Art 34 that it had no jurisdiction, and more significantly the CAT rejected 
the defence that it was an abuse of process to raise proceedings in the CAT where High Court 
proceedings were pending. The multiple claimants in this action raised proceedings seeking 
damages in the High Court, where MasterCard raised limitation defences to the claims under 
the various foreign laws which it contended govern the different claims in those High Court 
proceedings. In light of those limitation defences, and given the overlapping jurisdiction of 
the CAT and High Court, the claimants raised actions in the CAT as a protective measure, 
although the High Court claims were more extensive in scope.  Following the CRA, the CAT 
had full jurisdiction for competition law damages claims which is not restricted to follow-on 
damages actions. Here, since the CAT claim was commenced after 1 October 2015 but arose 
well before that date, it was governed by this transitional regime. The CAT concluded as 
follows:-  ‘The commencement of a claim under sect 47A CA in the Tribunal as a protective 
measure, with the expressed intention to have that claim heard together with a pending claim 
in the High Court, in the circumstances here, does not even come within striking distance of 
an abuse. Indeed, until the question of whether the FLPA and foreign rules of limitation apply 
to a claim under sect 47A had been determined, I consider that it is the course which many 
prudent legal advisers, faced with a limitation defence in the High Court, would have 
followed. ?75 
 
The Limitation Act provisions were finally considered by the English courts in a competition 
law context in Arcadia v Visa.76 This involved claims brought by retailers against Visa Europe 
and Visa Inc for breach of EU, UK and Irish competition law in relation to the inflated price for 
ĂĐĐĞƉƚŝŶŐĐƌĞĚŝƚĂŶĚĚĞďŝƚĐĂƌĚƐĂƐĂƌĞƐƵůƚŽĨƚŚĞŵƵůƚŝůĂƚĞƌĂůŝŶƚĞƌĐŚĂŶŐĞĨĞĞ ? ‘D/& ? ?ƐĞƚďǇ
Visa. It was held by the High Court that the level of information published by the Commission 
in 2001 and 2002 in two separate parts of the public enforcement process were sufficient for 
the claimants to establish the key ingredients of the claim. The Court of Appeal affirmed that 
                                                          
72 See for example Arcadia Group Brands and others v Visa Inc and others[2015] EWCA Civ 883 
discussed further infra. In Scotland, non-personal injury delictual claims have a prescriptive period of 
5 years Prescription and Limitation (Scotland) Act 1973 s6. See D Johnson, Prescription and Limitation. 
2nd edn, W. Green/SULI, 2012), When the pursuer is unaware of the loss, harm or damage they have 
suffered, the prescriptive period runs from the point they did, or reasonably should have, become so 
aware., s 11(3). 
73 See http://competitionbulletin.com/2015/10/01/private-actions-the-cra-2015-giveth-and-the-
2015-cat-rules-taketh-away/. 
74 27 July 2016 Case 1240/5/7/15, [2016] CAT 13. 
75 Ibid. at Para 45. 
76 5 August 2015, [2015] EWCA Civ 883. 
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none of the concealment issues raised by the appellant were sufficient to postpone the 
limitation period as they had sufficient facts to satisfy the statement of claim test at that 
stage. The Court of Appeal stressed that the Directive did not apply and that the application 
of the limitation rules in this way was not incompatible with the EU effectiveness principle. 
The court of Appeal noted (and affirmed the outcome):- 
 ‘ ? ?dŚĞ:ƵĚŐĞĂĐĐĞƉƚĞĚ ?Ăƚ ? ? ? ? ? ?ƚŚĂƚƚŚĞĨƵůůƉŝĐƚƵƌĞǁĂƐŶŽƚĂǀĂŝůĂďůĞƚŽƚŚĞĂƉƉĞůůĂŶƚƐ ?,Ğ
concluded (at [108]), however, that the facts which were known, or discoverable by the 
exercise of reasonable diligence, by the appellants before 2007 were sufficient to enable 
them to plead a statement of claim which established a prima facie case and that the issue 
under section 32(1)(b) of the 1980 Act is not concerned with other facts which the appellants 
say they did not, or still do not, know ? ? 
 
There were 2 subsequent rulings on the same issue in the same dispute by the High Court and 
the Court of Appeal in WH Newson Holding Ltd v IMI plc involving the complicated relationship 
between s32(1)(b)of the Limitation Act and s1(4) of the Civil Liability (Contribution) Act 1978, 
in contribution proceedings after the main action had settled.77 The Court of Appeal 
confirmed that the defendant in the contribution proceedings could not use the limitation 
defence as s.1(4) required the defendant in the main proceedings only to demonstrate that 
the factual basis of the claim would have disclosed a reasonable cause of action against him 
such as to make him liable in law to the claimant in respect of any damage. If he could do that 
then he would succeed against the defendant in the contribution proceedings. 
 
The Antitrust Damages Directive sets out to facilitate competition law damages actions across 
the EU by providing a minimum level of harmonisation of aspects of the procedural and 
substantive laws of the Member States in relation to such litigation. Although the focus in 
much of the academic commentary has been on the relationship between discovery and 
leniency documentation, and the passing-on defence and standing for indirect purchasers, in 
practice the formulation, interpretation and application of the limitation periods are of 
fundamental significance to competition litigation practice. Article 10 of the Directive 
provides for a specialised set of limitation (and prescription) rules. Although prima facie the 
establishment of a minimum 5 year limitation period is one of plus ca change (with the 6 and 
5 year periods in England and Wales and Scotland respectively being retained), it must be 
stressed that implementation of Article 10 introduces significant change to the determination 
of the limitation and prescription periods for competition damages actions in relation to 
infringements of both EU and UK competition law. The most significant reform relates to 
when the limitation period begins to run- the trigger point. First, the Directive ensures that 
this will not take place until after the illegal activity has ceased. The second and potentially 
significant deviation from existing practice concerns the claimant knowledge requirements to 
trigger the limitation period.78 These would appear to potentially shift the litigation balance 
in favour of competition law claimants vis-à-vis businesses which (allegedly) infringe 
competition law. It remains to be seen whether the new constructive knowledge 
                                                          
77  High Court, 17 June 2015, [2015] EWHC 1676 (Ch) and Court of Appeal, 27 July 2016,[2016] EWCA 
Civ 773. 
78 See Rodger 2017 ECLR supra. Of course Art 10 only sets minimum requirements and there is scope 
for potentially divergent approaches to time-limits and the trigger point across the Member States. 
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requirements will be retained as part of the competition limitation rules in the legal systems 
of the UK post-Brexit when the UK is no longer an EU Member State.79  
 
INTERIM PROCESS and SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES 
It should be noted that in addition to numerous minor less significant procedural orders and 
judgments by the CAT in the relevant period,80 there were various non-final interim process 
rulings involving consideration of substantive issues.  
                                                          
79 See Andreangeli supra. 
80 See also one of the multiple rulings involving Mastercard, in Sainsbury's Supermarkets Ltd v 
Mastercard Inc, on 19 December 2013, [2013] EWHC 4554 (Ch), concerning whether there should 
be a  ƚƌŝĂůŽĨĂƉƌĞůŝŵŝŶĂƌǇŝƐƐƵĞŽŶǁŚĞƚŚĞƌƚŚĞƐƵƉĞƌŵĂƌŬĞƚ ?ƐĐůĂŝŵĂŐĂŝŶƐƚƚŚĞŽǁŶĞƌƐŽĨĂĐƌĞĚŝƚ
scheme would be barred by the doctrine of ex turpi. This was rejected on the basis that it would not 
dispose of the entire claim;  Illumina Inc v Premaitha Health Plc, 1 July 2016, [2016] EWHC 1726 
(Pat), involved competition law only in outline at the procedural stage of the case where the 
defendant to patent infringement claims was allowed to serve revised non-technical defences raising 
various competition issues. 
31 July 2013  Case 1166/5/7/10 Albion water Limitred v Dwr Cymru Cyfngedig, [2013] CAT 16, costs, 
order to recover 85% of ATE premium as with other costs; 
30 May 2013  Case 2298/5/7/12 Siemens plc v National Grid; Case 1199/5/7/12, Capital Meters Ltd v 
National Grid plc [2013] CAT 11, order to vacate case management conference and stay proceedings; 
27 August 2013 Case 1173/5/7/10 Deutsche Bahn AG & others v Morgan Crucible co plc and others 
[2013] CAT 19 order in relation to time for seeking permission to appeal; 
29 August 2013 Case 1173/5/7/10 Deutsche Bahn AG & others v Morgan Crucible co plc and others 
[2013] CAT 20 order with case management directions v various defenders; 
24 September 2013 Case 1173/5/7/10 Deutsche Bahn AG & others v Morgan Crucible co plc and others 
[2013] CAT 22 order on permission to appeal; 
25 November 2013 Case 1173/5/7/10 Deutsche Bahn AG & others v Morgan Crucible co plc and others 
[2013] CAT 28 order on directions in relation to certain claimants; 
4 December 2013 Case 1173/5/7/10 Deutsche Bahn AG & others v Morgan Crucible co plc and others 
[2013] CAT 31 order listing a case management conference; 
9 Sep 2014 Case 1173/5/7/10 Deutsche Bahn AG & others v Morgan Crucible co plc and others [2014] 
CAT 15 order with case management directions v various defenders; 
9 February 2016 Case 1241/5/7/15 (T) ^ĂŝŶƐďƵƌǇ ?Ɛ ^ƵƉĞƌŵĂƌŬĞƚƐ >ƚĚ ǀ DĂƐƚĞƌĐĂƌĚ /ŶĐ ĂŶĚ ŽƚŚĞƌƐ
[2016] CAT 2, ruling on application for specific disclosure and admission of supplemental witness; 
26 April 2016 Case 1249/5/7/16 Socrates Training Ltd v The Law Society of England and wales [2016] 
CAT 5 order to extend time for filing of defence; 
9 February 2016 Case 1241/5/7/15 (T) ^ĂŝŶƐďƵƌǇ ?Ɛ ^ƵƉĞƌŵĂƌŬĞƚs Ltd v Mastercard Inc and others 
[2016] CAT 6 application by non-parties for access to non-confidential versions of certain categories 
of documents; 
16 May 2016 Case 1249/5/7/16 Socrates Training Ltd v The Law Society of England and wales [2016] 
CAT 7 successful application for fast track proceedings; 
15 June 2016 Case 1250/5/7/16 Breasley Pillows Limited and others v Vita Cellular Foams (UK) ltd and 
others  ? ? ? ? ? ?d ?ũƵĚŐŵĞŶƚŽŶĚĞĨĞŶĚĂŶƚƐ ?ĐŽƐƚƐĂƉƉůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶĨŽƌĨĂƐƚ-track proceedings under Rule 
58; 
26 April 2016 Case 1249/5/7/16 Socrates Training Ltd v The Law Society of England and wales [2016] 
CAT 10 judgment capping cost recovery; 
 ? ?^ĞƉƚĞŵďĞƌ  ? ? ? ?ĂƐĞ  ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?  ?d ?d  ? ?ŐĞŶƚƐ ?DƵƚƵĂů>ƚĚǀ'ĂƐĐŽŝŐŶĞ,ĂůŵĂŶ>ƚĚ  ?ƚ ?Ă
'ĂƐĐŽŝŐŶĞ,ĂůŵĂŶ ? ?ŐĞŶƚƐ ?Dutual Ltd v Moginie James ltd judgment explaining reasons for costs 
managements; 
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In Chemistree Homecare Ltd v Abbvie Ltd,81 the Court of Appeal upheld the refusal of an 
application for an interim injunction to require a UK drug distributor to meet an order by a 
particular pharmacy and homecare services provider on the basis that the judge was entitled 
to hold that there could not be an abuse of a dominant position as there was no prospect of 
demonstrating that the distributor held a dominant position. 
 
The first ruling in Packet Media Ltd v Telefonica UK Ltd,82 demonstrated that the courts are 
willing, where appropriate, to provide interlocutory injunctions to maintain the status quo in 
the context of a claim of abuse of dominance where damages would not ultimately be a 
suitable remedy.83 In this case there was an arguable case of abuse in the market for call and 
text origination services and an interim injunction was granted to prevent disconnection 
pending trial, given that the damage potentially suffered by refusal of an injunction was 
quantifiable and if disconnected there would be an immediate effect on its business and 
employees. 
 
In Deutsche Bank AG v Unitech Global Ltd84  the defendants were being sued under a bank 
loan in one action for a sum of over $150 m and in relation to an interest swap agreement for 
a sum in excess of $11 m. They contended that there had been a breach of Article 101 and 
the UK Chapter I prohibition, though it was accepted that the implications of an agreement 
being illegal and void under art 101 were for national law to determine. The Court of Appeal 
upheld the ruling refusing permission to amend the defence and counterclaim as there was 
no real prospect that the credit and swap agreements could be void as a result of the Libor 
arrangements being in breach of Article 101 and the Chapter 1 prohibition and there was no 
authority to the effect that vertical agreements being void as a result of a horizontal 
agreement infringing either prohibition.85  
 
Summary judgments 
 
This set of cases basically involve judgments where the defendant or the claimant has sought 
a summary judgment in order to dismiss the action or to strike out the defence.86 
                                                          
22 September 2016 1244/5/7/15 Peugeot Citroen Automobiles UK Ltd  and others v Pilkington Group 
Limited and others [2016] CAT 16, refusal of permission to appeal to Appeal court on preliminary issue; 
5 October 2016 Case 1249/5/7/16 Socrates Training Ltd v The Law Society of England and wales [2016] 
d ? ?ƉĂƌƚŝĂůůǇƌĞĨƵƐŝŶŐĚĞĨĞŶĚĂŶƚ ?ƐĂƉƉůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶƚŽĂĚĚƵĐĞĞǆƉĞƌƚĞǀŝĚĞŶĐĞ; 
 ? KĐƚŽďĞƌ  ? ? ? ? ĂƐĞ  ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?  ?d ? ŐĞŶƚƐ ? DƵƚƵĂů >ƚĚ ǀ 'ĂƐĐŽŝŐŶĞ ,ĂůŵĂŶ >ƚĚ  ?ƚ ?Ă 'ĂƐĐŽŝŐŶĞ
Halman) [2016] CAT 20 judgment on costs management; 
22 November 2016  Case 1241/5/7/15 (T) ^ĂŝŶƐďƵƌǇ ?Ɛ^ƵƉĞƌŵĂƌŬĞƚƐ>ƚĚǀDĂƐƚĞƌĐĂƌĚ/ŶĐĂŶĚŽƚŚĞƌƐ
[2016] CAT 23,permission to appeal refused; 
81 7 November 2013, [2013] EWCA Civ 1338. 
82 20 July 2015, [2015] EWHC 2235 (Ch). 
83 Cf for instance ; A.D. MacCulloch ĂŶĚĂƌƌǇ: ?ZŽĚŐĞƌ ? ‘ ‘tŝĞůĚŝŶŐƚŚĞůƵŶƚ^ǁŽƌĚ P/ŶƚĞƌŝŵZĞů ĞĨĨŽƌ
ƌĞĂĐŚĞƐŽĨŽŵƉĞƚŝƚŝŽŶ>ĂǁďĞĨŽƌĞƚŚĞh<ŽƵƌƚƐ ? ? ? ?   ? ? ? ?> ?Z ? ? ? ? ? 
84 Deutsche Bank AG v Unitech Global Ltd (Deutsche Bank AG v Unitech Ltd), 20 September 2013, 
[2013] EWHC 2793 (Comm) and 3 March 2016 (CA), [2016] EWCA Civ 119; [2016] 1 W.L.R. 
3598. 
85 See Courage v Crehan [1999] ECC 455, CA. 
86 Note there are some potential overlaps here with the interim process cases, discussed further supra. 
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This set of cases included two judgments by the Scottish courts in the same dispute, Scottish 
Premier League Ltd v Lisini Pub Management Co Ltd,87 by the Outer and Inner House of the 
ŽƵƌƚŽĨ^ĞƐƐŝŽŶ ?dŚĞ^ĐŽƚƚŝƐŚWƌĞŵŝĞƌ>ĞĂŐƵĞ ? ‘^W> ? ?ƌĂŝƐĞĚĂŶĂĐƚŝŽŶĂŐĂŝŶƐƚƚŚĞŽǁŶĞƌƐŽĨ
public houses seeking a permanent interdict based on an undertaking not to broadcast any 
live matches from premises using a broadcast from Poland and a decoder device. The ECJ had 
previously ruled in Football Association Premier League ltd v QC leisure88 that clauses 
prohibiting the use of foreign decoders and smart cards were void as a restriction of 
competition. Lisini counter-claimed that the SPL had acted in breach of arts 101 and 102 and 
sought damages. It was held, and upheld by the Inner House that there was a prima facie art 
101 case and the counterclaim could not be dismissed at that stage. 
 
The judgment in Martin Retail Group Ltd v Crawley BC,89 concerned the potential application 
of competition law to leases, which was interesting given the historical context whereby 
leases were originally excluded from the scope of the Competition Act 1998, and 
subsequently made subject to normal competition law principles,90 as demonstrated here.  In 
relation to a business tenancy in Crawley, East Sussex, the landlord proposed a user clause 
which would exclude the sale of alcohol, grocery, convenience goods, effectively prohibiting 
a newsagent from selling convenience goods. The tenant successfully claimed that the 
proposed restriction infringed the Competition Act 1998 subsequent to the Competition Act 
1998 (Land Agreement Exclusion Revocation) Order 2010.91 It was accepted that the clause 
may be contrary to s2 of the Act as an anti-competitive restriction and the landlord was 
unsuccessful with his argument that the restrictions were exemptable under s 9 of the Act- 
the domestic equivalent to Article 101(3) TFEU. In particular, the landlord failed to establish 
the criterion of efficiency as the court was not satisfied that the proposed restriction would 
improve the distribution of goods or economic progress and there was unlikely to be a price 
benefit for the community from the existence of the restrictions.  
 
There has been increasing consideration of the application of the EU competition rules to 
sporting context in recent years,92 and one of the early significant competition law cases 
before the English courts was indeed the high-profile litigation involving Stephen Hendry and 
the world snooker organisation.93 The Baker v British Boxing Board of Control94 judgment in 
2014involved a boxing promoter seeking interim remedies in relation to the withdrawal of his 
ďŽǆŝŶŐ ůŝĐĞŶĐĞ ƉĞŶĚŝŶŐ ŚŝƐ ĂƉƉĞĂů ? ,Ğ ĐůĂŝŵĞĚ ƚŚĂƚ ĐĞƌƚĂŝŶ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ŽĂƌĚ ?Ɛ ZĞŐƵůĂƚŝŽŶƐ
breached Art 101 and the Competition Act Chapter 1 and that the withdrawal of his licence 
was an abuse of dominance under Art 102 and the Chapter 2 prohibition.  These were rejected 
summarily and an interim injunction application was unsuccessful. In particular, in line with 
                                                          
87 25 March 2013, OH [2013] CSOH 48; 2013 SLT 629; Upheld by the Inner House 15 November 2013, 
[2013] CSIH 97; 2014 SC 300. 
88 [2011] E.C.R. I-9083. 
89 24 December 2013, [2014] L. & T.R. 17. 
90 The Competition Act 1998 (Land Agreement Exclusion Revocation) Order 2010SI 2010/1709. 
91 Ibid. 
92 See notably CaseC-519/04 P Meca-medina v Commission, CJEU, [2006] E.C.R. I-6991. 
93 See Hendry v World Professional Billiards & Snooker Association Ltd, [2002] U.K.C.L.R. 5; [2002] 
E.C.C. 8. 
94 25 June 2014, [2014] EWHC 2074 (QB). 
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Meca  ?Medina v European commission,95 the rules alleged to be in breach of the competition 
rules were inherent in the organisation of the sport  - ĂƐďĞŝŶŐƚŽ ‘ĞŶƐƵƌĞƚŚĂƚƚŚĞƐƉŽƌƚŝƐ
ĐŽŶĚƵĐƚĞĚ ĨĂŝƌůǇ ? ŝŶĐůƵĚŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ ŶĞĞĚ ƚŽ ƐĂĨĞŐƵĂƌĚ ĞƋƵĂů ĐŚĂŶĐĞƐ ĨŽƌ ƚŚĞ ďŽǆĞƌƐ ? ďŽǆĞƌƐ ?
health, the integrity and objectivity of ƚŚĞƐƉŽƌƚĂŶĚƚŚĞĞƚŚŝĐĂůǀĂůƵĞƐŝŶƚŚĞƐƉŽƌƚ ? ? 
 
In a subsequent ruling in Packet Media Ltd v Telefonica UK Ltd by the High Court,96 it was held 
that the claimant had failed to (come close to) establishing that the defendant mobile 
network operator had a dominant position- a failing in many cases brought under the abuse 
prohibition in the English courts.97 Accordingly its claim for abuse of dominant position would 
be struck out (and the interim injunction discharged though stayed for 14 days to allow 
customers to make alternative arrangements).  
 
In one of the cases against Mastercard,98 involving Tesco (Tesco Stores Ltd v Mastercard inc), the 
court considered the potential application of the economic entity doctrine and the ex turpi 
defence.99 /ŶƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƚŽƚŚĞĐůĂŝŵƚŚĂƚDĂƐƚĞƌĐĂƌĚ ?ƐĨĞĞƐǁĞƌĞĞǆĐĞƐƐŝǀĞ ?ŝŶƌĞůǇŝŶŐŽŶƚŚĞ
ŽŵŵŝƐƐŝŽŶ ?Ɛ ĨŝŶĚŝŶŐƐ ƚŚĂƚ ƚŚĞǇŚĂĚďƌĞĂĐŚĞĚĂƌƚ  ? ? ? ?DĂƐƚĞƌĐĂƌĚĂƌŐƵĞĚ ƚŚĂƚdĞƐĐŽĂŶĚ
Tesco Bank were part of the single economic entity, such that where the latter was 
parƚŝĐŝƉĂƚŝŶŐŝŶƚŚĞĂůůĞŐĞĚŝůůĞŐĂůĐĂƌƚĞůĂƌƌĂŶŐĞŵĞŶƚƵƉŽŶǁŚŝĐŚƚŚĞĨŽƌŵĞƌ ?ƐĐůĂŝŵƐǁĞƌĞ
based, those claims were accordingly barred under the ex turpi causa doctrine. It was held 
that it was not appropriate to dismiss the case summarily, that identifying a single economic 
entity,100 and, the application of the ex turpi causa defence, in particular ascertaining whether 
the claimant bore a significant responsibility, were both fact specific and required to be 
determined after trial. 
 
There was a second aspect to the Appeal Court ruling of 14 October in the Emerald Supplies 
Ltd v British Airways plc litigation.101  The Court of Appeal allowed an appeal against the earlier 
refusal to strike out parts of the claim.102 In this dispute, the claimants pursued their claims 
under the economic torts because they would not have been able to seek a remedy for the 
full range of the damage caused by the alleged cartel, partly in relation to claims that fell 
outside the scope of EU/EEA law for some flights, and partly as EU/EůĂǁĚŝĚŶ ?ƚƌĞŐƵůĂƚĞ
airline routes between EU/EEA and third countries till May 2004.103 Nonetheless in relation 
to both torts relied upon: interference with business by unlawful means and conspiracy to 
use unlawful means, the claimant required to demonstrate an intent to injure by the 
                                                          
95 [2006] ECR I-6991. 
96 December 14, 2015, [2015] EWHC 3873 (Ch). 
97 See B Rodger  ‘ŽŵƉĞƚŝƚŝŽŶ>Ăǁ>ŝƚŝŐĂƚŝŽŶŝŶƚŚĞh<ŽƵƌƚƐ PĂƐƚƵĚǇŽĨĂůůĐases 2005- ? ? ? ? ?- Parts I 
and II [2009] 2 Global Competition Litigation Review 93-114 and 136- ? ? ? ĂŶĚ  ‘ŽŵƉĞƚŝƚŝŽŶ >Ăǁ
litigation in the UK Courts: A study of all cases 2009- ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?'>Z ? ?-67. 
98 Tesco Stores Ltd v Mastercard inc, 24 April 2015, [2015] EWHC 1145 (Ch). 
99 See the Courage v Crehan litigation saga. 
100 See Case C-97/08 P, Akzo Nobel Nv v Commission [2009] E.C.R. I-8237 and Durkan Holdings ltd v 
OFT (2011) CAT 6. 
101 14 October 2015, [2015] EWCA Civ 1024. 
102 [2014] EWHC 3514 (Ch). 
103 See Ministere Public v Asjes Cases C-209/84 to C-213-84 [1986] ECR 1457 and Ahmed Saeed 
Flugreuseb v Zentrale zur Bekampfung Ulauterer Wettbewerb eV [1989] ECR 803. 
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defendant.104 Moreover, as earlier established by WH Newson Holding Ltd,105 intent was not 
a necessary inference from the facts or the findings by the Commission. In this case it was not 
inherent in the nature of the pricing arrangements that the shipper claimants would suffer 
ůŽƐƐǁŚĞƌĞƚŚĞǇŵŝŐŚƚƉĂƐƐƚŚĂƚůŽƐƐĚŽǁŶƚŚĞĐŚĂŝŶ ?/ŶƚĞŶƚƚŽŝŶũƵƌĞĂƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌĐůĂŝŵĂŶƚŚĂĚ
ƚŽďĞƚŚĞĐĂƵƐĞŽĨĂĚĞĨĞŶĚĂŶƚ ?ƐĐŽŶĚƵĐƚƚŽƐƵĐĐĞĞĚĂŶĚƚŚŝƐǁŽƵůĚŶŽƚďĞƚŚĞĐĂƐĞŝĨƚŚĞ
defendant was not sure the claimant would certainly suffer the loss. This ruling certainly 
makes it very difficult for economic tort claims to succeed in any price-fixing chain context, 
where cartel claims most commonly arise, whether by direct or indirect purchasers. In that 
context the Court of Appeal noted that extension of the economic tort claims to this context 
ǁŽƵůĚ ŚĂǀĞ ƚŚĞ  ‘ƵŶĚĞƐŝƌĂďůĞ ĞĨĨĞĐƚ ŽĨ ĞǆƚĞŶĚŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ ĞĨĨĞĐƚ ŽĨ ĐŽŵƉĞƚŝƚŝŽŶ ůĂǁ ? ďǇ
circumventing the scope of EU/EEA law, and it would dilute the concept of intention and bring 
it to close to the concept of foreseeability.106  
 
Unwired Planet International Ltd v Huawei Technologies Co Ltd107  was a complicated case 
relating to a patent infringement suit brought by Unwired Planet (UP) against Samsung and 
others in relation to a patent portfolio which included standard essential patents (SEPs). UP 
had acquired several of its patents from Ericsson by way of an agreement which Samsung and 
the other defendants argued was void for breach of EU and UK competition law on a number 
of different grounds. KŶĞ ŽĨ ^ĂŵƐƵŶŐ ?Ɛ ĚĞĨĞŶĐĞ ĂƌŐƵŵĞŶƚƐ ǁĂƐthat the UP/Ericsson 
agreement ĚŝĚŶŽƚĨƵůůǇƚƌĂŶƐĨĞƌƌŝĐƐƐŽŶ ?Ɛ&ZEƵŶĚĞƌƚĂŬŝŶŐ  W inter alia because (i) hW ?Ɛ 
FRAND undertaking was not enforceable by third parties, and (ii) the agreement did not 
prevent UP from obtaining licence terms that were more favourable to those that Ericsson 
itself could secure. This argument was struck out in its entirety by Mr Justice Birss in the first 
instance. On appeal, the strike out in relation to point (i) above was upheld, but set aside in 
relation to point (ii). The Court of Appeal agreed with Samsung that it is arguable that Article 
 ? ? ?ƌĞƋƵŝƌĞƐƚŚĞĞĨĨĞĐƚŝǀĞƚƌĂŶƐĨĞƌŽĨƌŝĐƐƐŽŶ ?Ɛ&ZEŽďůŝŐĂƚŝŽŶƚŽhW ?ŝŶĐůƵĚŝŶŐƚŚĞŶŽŶ-
discrimination obligation, such that UP could not obtain more favourable terms than Ericsson 
could have obtained. Whilst the Court acknowledged that the questions on practical 
workability of ƚƌĂŶƐĨĞƌƌŝŶŐƌŝĐƐƐŽŶ ?Ɛ&ZEŽďůŝŐĂƚŝŽŶ ƌĂŝƐĞĚďǇDƌ:ƵƐƚŝĐĞ ŝƌƐƐƉƌŽǀŝĚĞĚ
 “ƉŽǁĞƌĨƵů ƐƵƉƉŽƌƚ ? ĨŽƌ ƌŝĐƐƐŽŶ ?Ɛ ƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶ ? ƚŚĞƐĞ ƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶƐ ǁĞƌĞ ŶŽƚ  “ŶĞĐĞƐƐĂƌŝůǇ
ƵŶĂŶƐǁĞƌĂďůĞ ? ĂŶĚ ĚŝĚ ŶŽƚ ? ƚŚĞƌĞĨŽƌĞ ? ũƵƐƚŝĨǇ Ă ƐƵŵŵĂƌǇ ĚŝƐŵŝƐƐĂů  W  particularly in a 
developing area of law. 
 
Apollo Window Blinds Limited v McNeil,108 concerned a franchise agreement, and an attempt 
by the franchisor to enforce post-termination provisions in the agreement. The franchisor 
claimed that the restrictive covenants were necessary to protect its good will and know-how 
for a 12 month period, in line with the Pronuptia criteria,109 but the franchisee claimed not to 
ŚĂǀĞƌĞĐĞŝǀĞĚĂŶǇŬŶŽǁŚŽǁďǇƚƌĂŝŶŝŶŐ ?/ƚǁĂƐĂĐĐĞƉƚĞĚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞĨƌĂŶĐŚŝƐĞĞ ?ƐĐŽŵƉĞƚŝƚŝŽŶ
law point was not unarguable, but an interim injunction was not granted on the basis that 
                                                          
104 See Douglas v Hello (No3), CA [2006] QB 125. 
105 [2013] EWCA Civ 1377. 
106 Ibid at para 174. 
107 Also known as:  Unwired Planet Inc v Samsung Electronics Co Ltd, 27 May 2016, CA, [2016] EWCA 
Civ 489; [2016] 5 C.M.L.R. 11. 
108 14 July 2016, [2016] EWHC 2307 (QB). 
109 Case C-161/84, Pronuptia de Paris GmbH v Pronuptia de Paris Irmgard Schillgalis, CJEU, [1986] 
E.C.R. 353; [1986] 1 C.M.L.R. 414. 
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damages would be an adequate remedy. 
 
The combination of various factors: the increasing significance of (EU) competition law; the 
international cross-border impact of anti-competitive activity; awareness of the private law 
rights created by competition law infringements; and the increasing resort to litigation 
particularly in relation to wide-scale international cartels, means that private international 
law rules within the EU have a considerable role to play in determining the rights and 
obligations arising out of anti-competitive activity.110 The rules determining the civil 
jurisdiction of the courts in the EU, and consequently where in the EU an action based on a 
competition law infringement may be raised, are now provided in the recast Brussels Ia 
Regulation.111 One of the early significant cases before the CAT, which ultimately led to an 
appeal to the Supreme Court, Deutsche Bahn AG v Morgan Crucible co plc and others,112 
involved a judgment on jurisdiction issues in 2013, in relation to the application of Arts 5(3) 
and 24 of the Brussels I RegulatiŽŶ ?dŚĞƵƌŽƉĞĂŶŽŵŵŝƐƐŝŽŶ ?ƐĞĐŝƐŝŽŶŽĨ ?ĞĐĞŵďĞƌ ? ? ? ?
ŝŶ ƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶ ƚŽ  “ůĞĐƚƌŝĐĂů ĂŶĚ ŵĞĐŚĂŶŝĐĂů ĐĂƌďŽŶ ĂŶĚ ŐƌĂƉŚŝƚĞ ƉƌŽĚƵĐƚƐ ?113 found that the 
seven addressees of the Decision had participated in a single and continuous infringement of 
Art 101. There was an anchor defender under art 6(1) (now Art 8(1) Brussels ia) but argument 
proceeded on the basis that the anchor defender may be lost to the proceedings and whether 
they could pursue under art 5(3). The central question was whether the claimants had a good 
arguable case that damage was suffered in the UK. There was considerable discussion of the 
indirect damage case law in Dumez France and Marinari by the CAT.114 The CAT ultimately 
found that there was jurisdiction under art 5(3) as there was direct damage when purchases 
were made from subsidiaries  W this did not constitute indirect damage,115 otherwise a cartelist 
could avoid damages liability by implementing through a subsidiary. Accordingly purchases 
can be direct where through a subsidiary just as a parent company is liable under EU law for 
                                                          
110 ^ĞĞĂůƐŽ^ĂƐƐĞ ? ? ? ‘WƌŝǀĂƚĞĂŵĂŐĞƐĐƚŝŽŶƐĂŶĚƚŚĞ>ŝŵŝƚĂƚŝŽŶƐŽĨh^ Class Actions for a Global 
^ŽůƵƚŝŽŶ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?Global Competition Litigation Review, 1 (2), 106 W ? ? ? ?ĂŶĚĂůƐŽĚŽůƉŚƐĞŶ ?: ? ? ‘dŚĞ
ŽŶĨůŝĐƚŽĨ>ĂǁƐŝŶĂƌƚĞůDĂƚƚĞƌƐŝŶĂ'ůŽďĂůŝƐĞĚtŽƌůĚ PůƚĞƌŶĂƚŝǀĞƐƚŽƚŚĞĨĨĞĐƚƐŽĐƚƌŝŶĞ ? ?Journal 
of Private International Law, (2005) 1 (1), 151 W83 on the limits of the extraterritorial application of the 
US antitrust rules in the context of international cartels, particularly following the Vitamins cartel. 
There are, of course, considerable difficulties involved in accessing information necessary to pursue 
ĂŶŝŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůĐŽŵƉĞƚŝƚŝŽŶ ůĂǁĐůĂŝŵ ?&ŽƌĨƵƌƚŚĞƌĚŝƐĐƵƐƐŝŽŶ ?ƐĞĞ/ĚŽƚ ?> ?  ‘ĐĐĞƐƐƚŽǀŝĚĞŶĐĞĂŶĚ
&ŝůĞƐ ŽĨ ŽŵƉĞƚŝƚŝŽŶ ƵƚŚŽƌŝƚŝĞƐ ? Ś  ? ? ĂŶĚ ^ƚƵĐŬĞ ? D ? ?  ‘ŝƐĐŽǀĞƌǇ ŝŶ 'ůŽďĂů ĐŽŶŽŵǇ ? ? Ś  ? ?ŝŶ
Basedow, J, Francq, S, and Idot, L, (eds) International Antitrust litigation, Conflict of Laws and 
Coordination, Hart Publishing, 2011, where different aspects of this problem are considered in detail. 
111 Regulation 44/2001, [2001] OJ L 12/1, replaced by Regulation 1215/2012, [2012] OJ L 351/1. The 
ZĞŐƵůĂƚŝŽŶƌĞƉůĂĐĞĚƚŚĞƌƵƐƐĞůƐŽŶǀĞŶƚŝŽŶ ?&ŽƌĚŝƐĐƵƐƐŝŽŶ ?ƐĞĞZŽĚŐĞƌ ? ? ? ‘dŚĞŽŵŵƵŶŝƚĂƌŝƐĂƚŝŽŶ
ŽĨ /ŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂů WƌŝǀĂƚĞ >Ăǁ P ZĞĨŽƌŵ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ƌƵƐƐĞůƐ ŽŶǀĞŶƚŝŽŶ ďǇ ZĞŐƵůĂƚŝŽŶ ? ?  ? ? ? ? ? ? :ƵƌŝĚŝĐĂů
Review, 59 W67 and 69 W80. 
112 15 August 2013, Case 1173/5/7/10 [2013] CAT 18. 
113 In Case No C.38.359, OJ L 125, 28.4.2004, p. 45 W49. 
114 [2013] CAT 18, at paras 22-45. 
115 See in particular para 44, check, where the CAT stressed that both the direct and indirect purchasers 
were within the h< ?ĂŶĚƚŚĂƚƚŚŝƐǁĂƐŶŽƚĂŶ “ŝŶĚŝƌĞĐƚ ?ůŽƐƐĐůĂŝŵŝŶůŝŶĞǁŝƚŚDumez France, although 
ŝƚŶŽƚĞĚƚŚĂƚ ‘ĚŝĨĨŝĐƵůƚƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶƐ ?ŵŝŐŚƚĂƌŝƐĞǁŚĞƌĞƚŚĞĚŝƌĞĐƚĂŶĚŝŶĚŝƌĞĐƚƉƵƌĐŚĂƐĞƌƐǁĞƌĞďĂƐĞĚŝŶ
different jurisdictions.  
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the actions of a subsidiary which implements a cartel.116 The CAT also rejected the 
ĞĨĞŶĚĂŶƚƐ ? ĐŽŶƚĞŶƚŝŽŶ ƚŚĂƚ ŽƌĚĞƌŝŶŐ ƚŚĞŵ  ƚŽ ĚĞĨĞŶĚƚŚĞ h< ůĂŝŵĂŶƚƐ ? ĐůĂŝŵƐ ǁŽƵůĚ
amount to a submission by the Defendants to the TribuŶĂů ?Ɛ ũƵƌŝƐĚŝĐƚŝŽŶ ŽǀĞƌ ƚŚĞ ĞŶƚŝƌĞ
proceedings, and not just the those claims, under Article 24 of the Brussels I Regulation.117 
Provided any challenge to jurisdiction is made either before118 or at the same time as the 
arguments on the merits, a defendant can enter an appearance to contest the merits without 
submitting to the jurisdiction it challenges.  The Article 5(3),119 issue was appealed to the 
Court of Appeal,120 which confirmed thĞd ?Ɛƌuling that an indirect purchaser who claimed 
to have suffered financial damage in the UK qualified as immediate victims and could rely on 
Article 5(3).121 
 
There was yet another Mastercard-related IPL ruling this time by the CAT, in 2015 in DSG 
Retail limited and another v Mastercard Inc and others,122 in relation to English rules on 
service out of the jurisdiction, in the context of a s47A claim before the CAT. Jurisdiction was 
established against one defendant, domiciled in Belgium, under Article 7(2) of the Brussels Ia 
Regulation.123 However in relation to other non-EU based defendants, the CAT applied the 
threefold test set out in VTB Capital plc v Nutritek International Corp,124 to determine if it 
would exercise jurisdiction, where there were no specific rules jn the Competition Act 1998 
or CAT Rules:- 1)Whether there was serious  issue to be tried on the merits; 2)that there was 
a good arguable case that the claim fell within one of the classes of case for service out under 
CPR PD 6B and 3) whether England was the appropriate forum for trial of the dispute. The 
court was satisfied on each of these points for claims up to the date of the Commission 
decision which established the particular infringement being relied upon in the proceedings. 
 The other IPL related ruling was also by the CAT, in 2016, in Deutsche Bahn AG and others v 
Mastercard Inc and others,125 in relation to limitation periods under the Foreign Limitation 
Periods Act 1984. The CAT confirmed in accordance with existing statutory provision and CAT 
                                                          
116 See Roche Products Limited v Provimi Limited [2003] EWHC 961 (Comm) at [31]-[32]; Emerson 
Electric Co v Mersen UK Portslade Limited [2012] EWCA Civ 1557 at [73], [76] and [82. See also B 
WarĚŚĂƵŐŚ ? ‘WƵŶŝƐŚŝŶŐƉĂƌĞŶƚƐĨŽƌƚŚĞƐŝŶƐŽĨƚŚĞŝƌĐŚŝůĚ PĞǆƚĞŶĚŝŶŐhŽŵƉĞƚŝƚŝŽŶůŝĂďŝůŝƚǇŝŶŐƌŽƵƉƐ
and ƚŽƐƵďĐŽŶƚƌĂĐƚŽƌƐ ? ? ? ? ? ? ?:ŽƵƌŶĂůŽĨŶƚŝƚƌƵƐƚŶĨŽƌĐĞŵĞŶƚ ? ?-48. 
117 Case 150/80, Elefanten Schuh GmbH v Jacqmain [1981] ECR 1671 and Harada Limited v Turner 
[2003] EWCA Civ 1695. 
118 As was the case here. 
119 Now Article 7(2) Brussels Ia, Regulation 1215/2012. 
120 20 November 2013, [2013] EWCA Civ 1484. 
121 ^ĞĞZŽĚŐĞƌ ? ‘hŽŵƉĞƚŝƚŝŽŶ>ĂǁĂŶĚƉƌŝǀĂƚĞ/ŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂů>Ăǁ PĂĚĞǀĞůŽƉŝŶŐƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŚŝƉ ?Ś ?
in I Lianos and D Geradin (eds), Handbook on European Competition Law: Enforcement and Procedure, 
Edward Elgar:2013. 
122 22 April 2015 Case 1236/7/15 DSG Retail limited and another v Mastercard Inc and others [2015] 
CAT 7. 
123 Ex Art 5(3). 
124 [2012] EWCA Civ 808 paras 18-19. 
125 27 July 2016 Case 1240/5/7/15 Deutsche Bahn AG and others v Mastercard Inc and others; Case 
1244/5/7/15 Peugeot Citroen Automobiles UK Ltd  and others v Pilkington Group Limited and others 
[2016] CAT 14. 
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case-law, that limitation periods are substantive legal provisions by nature,126 and accordingly 
ǁŚĞƌĞĨŽƌĞŝŐŶůĂǁǁĂƐĂƉƉůŝĐĂďůĞƚŽĚĞƚĞƌŵŝŶĞƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌĐůĂŝŵƐ ?ƚŚĂƚĨŽƌĞŝŐŶůĂǁ ?ƐůŝŵŝƚĂƚŝŽŶ
rules would also be applicable.127 
 
In this period there were also two judgments in the international context focusing on the 
territorial scope of the application of the EU rules in relation to private damages claims. In  
Iiyama Benelux Bv v Schott AG128 in relation to a damages claim following the Cathode ray 
tube cartel, where it was held that the damages claims lacked a sufficient territorial 
connection with the EEA for Art 101 to apply. There was no arguable case that the cartel had 
been implemented there.129  The immediate consequences of the pricing were in non-EU 
ŵĂƌŬĞƚƐ ?ĂŶĚĂŵĞƌĞ ‘end of road effect ? on pricing of purchases in Europe did not satisfy the 
requirements of the implementation test.130 On the other hand, in Iiyama (Uk) Ltd v Samsung 
Electronics Co ltd,131 a dispute following the world-wide price-fixing cartel by certain 
manufacturers in the liquid crystal displays sector (LCD).  It was held that the infringement 
was potentially within the territorial scope of Article 101 where the claimant suffered loss and 
damage where buying products outside the EU at a price higher than would otherwise have 
been available in the EU if the cartel had not been implemented in the EU.132 The final issue 
concerned jurisdiction and whether the court should exercise it in relation to defenders based 
in South Korea. The courts of England and Wales were considered to be clearly and distinctly 
the more appropriate forum in relation to one of the defendants where it was in control of 
the pricing policies of the various defenders based in England and wales. As regards another 
Korean defendant it was held that service out would also be appropriate to avoid the potential 
for duplicating litigation and the risk of inconsistent findings. 
 
 
Substantive Judgments 
Anti-competitive agreements 
The 2014 ruling in Carewatch Care Services Ltd v Focus Caring Services Ltd,133 concerned the 
application of the classic Pronuptia criteria134 in the context of a franchising arrangement. The 
franchisor was a provider of home care services and the dispute concerned restrictive 
covenants which operated for 12 months from the termination of the franchise agreement. 
                                                          
126 In England and Wales, see FLPA s 1; and in Scotland see s23A of the P and L (Sc) Act 1984; see also  
1240/5/7/15 Deutsche Bahn AG and Others v MasterCard Incorporated and Others; 1244/5/7/15 
Peugeot Citroën Automobiles UK LTD and Others v Pilkington Group Limited and Others; [2016] CAT 14. 
127 This may lead to limitation issues being raised more frequently in cases with a foreign element and 
potentially lead to more generous foreign limitation periods where the CAT limitation period has 
expired under Rule 119.  
128 23 May 2016, [2016 5 CMLR 15, (Ch). It was also held that these were pure follow-on claims bit that 
ƚŚĞǇĚŝĚŶŽƚŝŶĨĂĐƚƌĞĨůĞĐƚƚŚĞŽŵŵŝƐƐŝŽŶ ?ƐŝŶĨƌŝŶŐĞŵĞŶƚĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶ ? 
129  Case C-89/85  A Ahlstrom Osakeyhtio v Commission of the European Communities, [1993] E.C.R. 
I-1307. 
130 Ibid, see also Case T-286/09 Intel Corp v European Commission, [2014] 5 C.M.L.R. 9. 
131  29 July 2016, [2016] EWHC 1980 (Ch); [2016] 5 C.M.L.R. 16. 
132 See Case C-89/85  A Ahlstrom Osakeyhtio v Commission of the European Communities, [1993] 
E.C.R. I-1307, and Case T-102/96, Gencor Ltd v Commission,  [1999] E.C.R. II-753. 
133 11 July 2014, [2014] EWHC 2313 (Ch). 
134 Pronuptia, supra. 
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The franchisee argued that the restrictive covenants- containing non-competition and non-
solicitation clauses, were caught by s 2(1) of the Competition Act 1998. Nonetheless, it was 
held in accordance with Pronuptia, that the restrictions were necessary in order to protect 
the know-how of the franchisor and to maintain the identity and reputatŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞĨƌĂŶĐŚŝƐŽƌ ?Ɛ
network, and were accordingly enforceable.135 
 
The most significant substantive ruling in the period was the recent CAT ruling in one of the 
disputes involving Mastercard in ^ĂŝŶƐďƵƌǇ ?Ɛ^ ƵƉĞƌŵĂƌŬĞƚƐ>ƚĚǀDĂƐƚĞƌĐĂƌĚ/ŶĐĂŶĚŽƚŚĞƌƐ.136 
This claim had been transferred from the High court,137 involving a damages claim in respect 
ŽĨ DĂƐƚĞƌĐĂƌĚ ?ƐMultilateral interchange fee  ? ‘D/& ? ?. The Tribunal held that there was an 
infringement of Article 101 and ƚŚĂƚ^ĂŝŶƐďƵƌǇ ?ƐǁĞƌĞentitled to recover nearly £70 million 
in damages.  The CAT basically held that there was an agreement which was a restriction of 
competition by effect not object, that, but for the UK MIF, bilateral interchange fees at a lower 
level would have been agreed in place of the UK MIF.138 Moreover the arrangements were 
not exemptable and the illegality (ex turpi causa principle) defence failed. In this context there 
was considerable discussion of the ex turpi defence,139 and the CAT also considered in detail 
                                                          
135 The franchisor was entitled to both injunctive releief and damages in enforcing the covenants. 
136 14 July 2016 Case 1241/5/7/15 (T) ^ ĂŝŶƐďƵƌǇ ?Ɛ^ ƵƉĞƌŵĂƌŬĞƚƐ>ƚĚǀDĂƐƚĞƌĐĂƌĚInc and others [2016] 
CAT 11. 
137 30 November 2015, [2015] EWHC 3472 (Ch), discussed supra. 
138 Para 267:-  ‘For these reasons, we conclude that in the counterfactual world that would be likely to 
exist in the absence of a UK MIF set by MasterCard, there would be very significant and better 
competition in the acquiring market than existed in the real world over the claim period. We consider 
that neither the issuing market nor competition between payment schemes would be adversely 
affected. In these circumstances, we are of the view that the UK MIF was a restriction on competition 
by effect within the meaning of Article 101(1) TFEU. ? 
See also para 548:-  ‘But for the UK MIF, bilaterally agreed Interchange Fees would have been agreed 
in place of the UK MIF (paragraph 266 above). These bilaterally agreed Interchange Fees would have 
been: (i) In the case of MasterCard credit card transactions, the equivalent of 0.50% (rather than 0.9%) 
(paragraph 226 above). (ii) In the case of MasterCard debit card transactions, the equivalent of 0.27% 
(rather than 0.36%) (paragraph 233(3) above). ? 
139 See paras 290-419. See in particular at  para 307:-  ‘We conclude that: (1) Since the ex turpi causa 
principle is concerned with claims founded on acts which are contrary to the public law of the state 
and engage the public interest, infringements of competition law can be, but are not necessarily, 
sufficiently turpitudinous so as to trigger the principle. (2) Whether an infringement of competition 
ůĂǁĐĂŶƚƌŝŐŐĞƌĂŶŝůůĞŐĂůŝƚǇĚĞĨĞŶĐĞĚĞƉĞŶĚƐƵƉŽŶǁŚĞƚŚĞƌƚŚĂƚŝŶĨƌŝŶŐĞŵĞŶƚŝƐĂŶ “ŝŶŶŽĐĞŶƚ ?ŽŶĞ ?ŝŶ
ǁŚŝĐŚĐĂƐĞ ?ǁĞĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌŝƚĐĂŶŶŽƚ ?ŽƌĂ “ŶĞŐůŝŐĞŶƚ ?Žƌ “ĚĞůŝďĞƌĂƚĞ ?ŽŶĞ ?ŝŶǁŚŝĐŚĐĂƐĞŝƚŵĂǇĚŽ ? ? ? ? ? 
tĞĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌƚŚĂƚƚŚĞĚƌĂǁŝŶŐŽĨƐƵĐŚĂĚŝƐƚŝŶĐƚŝŽŶŝƐŽŶĞƚŚĂƚŝƐĐŽŵƉĞůůĞĚďǇ>ŽƌĚ^ ƵŵƉƚŝŽŶ ?ƐĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐ
ŽĨ “ƐƚƌŝĐƚůŝĂďŝůŝƚǇ ?ŝŶĨƌŝŶŐĞŵĞŶƚƐ ? ? ?ĂŶĚďǇƚŚĞĨĂĐƚƚŚĂƚ ?ĨŽƌƉĞŶĂůƚǇƉƵƌƉŽƐĞƐ ?ƚŚŝƐŝƐƉƌĞĐŝƐĞůǇƚŚĞ
distinction drawn in section 36(3) of the Competition Act 1998. 204 If Parliament and EU law have 
determined that the regulatory authorities should have no jurisdiction to punish innocent, as opposed 
to negligent or intentional, breaches of competition law, then we consider this to be clear guidance 
as to what would and would not engage the public interest for the purposes of the illegality defence.  
 See also para 419:-  ‘ ? ? ?ŽŶĐůƵƐŝŽŶŽŶǆdƵƌƉŝĂƵƐĂ ? ? ? ?/ŶƚŚĞůŝŐŚƚŽĨƚŚĞ ĂďŽǀĞ ?DĂƐƚĞƌĂƌĚ ?ƐĞǆ
turpi causa argument fails for the following reasons: (1) There is no, or insufficient, turpitude on the 
ƉĂƌƚŽĨ^ĂŝŶƐďƵƌǇ ?ƐĂŶŬ ? ? ? ?^ĂŝŶƐďƵƌǇ ?ƐĂŶŬĂŶĚ^ĂŝŶƐďƵƌǇ ?ƐĂƌĞŶŽƚŵĞŵďĞƌƐŽĨĂƌĞůĞǀĂŶƚ “ƐŝŶŐůĞ
ĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐ ƵŶŝƚ ? Žƌ  “ƵŶĚĞƌƚĂŬŝŶŐ ? ǁŝƚŚŝŶ ƚŚĞ ŵĞĂŶŝŶŐ ŽĨ ƌƚŝĐůĞ  ? ? ? ? ? ? d&h ?  ? ? ? ǀĞŶ ŝĨ ƚŚĞƐĞ
companiĞƐĂƌĞĞĂĐŚŵĞŵďĞƌƐŽĨƚŚĞƐĂŵĞƌĞůĞǀĂŶƚ “ƵŶĚĞƌƚĂŬŝŶŐ ? ?ĂŶǇŝŶĨƌŝŶŐŝŶŐĐŽŶĚƵĐƚŽŶƚŚĞƉĂƌƚ
ŽĨ^ĂŝŶƐďƵƌǇ ?ƐĂŶŬŝƐŶŽƚƚŽďĞĂƚƚƌŝďƵƚĞĚƚŽ^ĂŝŶƐďƵƌǇ ?ƐƐŽĂƐƚŽƌĞŶĚĞƌƚŚĞůĂƚƚĞƌůŝĂďůĞĂůŽŶŐǁŝƚŚ
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the related question of the attribution of liability and the concept of the undĞƌƚĂŬŝŶŐŽƌ ‘ƐŝŶŐůĞ
ĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐ ƵŶŝƚ ? ĨŽƌ ƚŚĞ ƉƵƌƉŽƐĞƐ ŽĨ h ĐŽŵƉůĞƚŝŽŶ ůĂǁ ŐĞŶĞƌĂůůǇ ĂŶĚ ĨŽƌ ƚŚŝƐ ĚĞĨĞŶĐĞ
specifically. 140 The CAT also considered in detail the issue of quantification of damages, in 
only the third, and most complicated case, in which it has awarded and assessed damages.141 
The general principles informing the calculation of the overcharge damages award142 are 
ĐŽŵƉĞŶƐĂƚŝŽŶ ?ƌĞƉĂƌĂƚŝŽŶ ? ƚŚĞ ďĂůĂŶĐĞ ŽĨ ƉƌŽďĂďŝůŝƚŝĞƐ ĂŶĚ  ‘ǁŚĞŶ ĐĂƌƌǇŝŶŐ ŽƵƚ ƐƵĐŚ ĂŶ
assessment, where there is an element of estimation and assumption  W as frequently there 
will be  W ƌĞƐƚŽƌĂƚŝŽŶďǇǁĂǇŽĨĐŽŵƉĞŶƐĂƚŝŽŶŝƐŽĨƚĞŶĂĐĐŽŵƉůŝƐŚĞĚďǇ “ƐŽƵŶĚŝŵĂŐŝŶĂƚŝŽŶ ?
ĂŶĚ Ă  “ďƌŽĂĚ ĂǆĞ ? ? ?143 There was also considerable reflection by the CAT on the pass-on 
defence and underlying principle and focus on compensation and avoiding over-
compensation,144 particularly where indirect purchasers are involved,. The CAT discussed the 
Antitrust Damages Directive145 noting in passing that 2 provisions of the Directive146 dealt 
ǁŝƚŚ ‘the burden of proof and the need to avoid over- or under-compensation between rival 
claimant levels or groups and potential defendants is a clear demonstration of the difficulties 
inherent in the pass-on defence. ?147 The CAT proceeded at para 484 to both confirm for the 
first time the recognition of overcharge claims by indirect purchasers and the existence of a 
passing-on defence for defendants.148 DĂƐƚĞƌĐĂƌĚ ?Ɛ ƉĂƐƐŝŶŐ ŽŶ ĚĞĨĞŶĐĞ ĨĂŝůĞĚ ĂƐ ƚŚĞ d
ƐƚƌĞƐƐĞĚ  ‘ƚŚĂƚ ƚŚĞ ƉĂƐƐ-ŽŶ  “ĚĞĨĞŶĐĞ ? ŽƵŐŚƚ ŽŶůǇ ƚŽ ƐƵĐĐĞĞĚ ǁŚĞƌĞ ? ŽŶ ƚŚĞ ďĂůĂŶĐĞ ŽĨ
probabilities, the defendant has shown that there exists another class of claimant, 
downstream of the claimant(s) in the action, to whom the overcharge has been passed on. 
Unless the defendant (and we stress that the burden is on the defendant) demonstrates the 
existence oĨƐƵĐŚĂĐůĂƐƐ ?ǁĞĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌƚŚĂƚĂĐůĂŝŵĂŶƚ ?ƐƌĞĐŽǀĞƌǇŽĨƚŚĞŽǀĞƌĐŚĂƌŐĞŝŶĐƵƌƌĞĚ
ďǇ ŝƚ ƐŚŽƵůĚ ŶŽƚ ďĞ ƌĞĚƵĐĞĚ Žƌ ĚĞĨĞĂƚĞĚ ŽŶ ƚŚŝƐ ŐƌŽƵŶĚ ? ?149 There was also a detailed 
discussion and calculation of the appropriate levels of interest to be added to the damages 
awards,150 and a subsequent ruling on the effect of taxation on the damages award and 
interest to be paid on the damages.151 For the purposes of comprehensiveness, it should be 
                                                          
^ĂŝŶƐďƵƌǇ ?ƐĂŶŬĨŽƌĂŶǇƐƵĐŚŝŶĨƌŝŶŐĞŵĞŶƚ ? ? ? ? ? ? ?/ŶĂŶǇ ĞǀĞŶƚ ?^ĂŝŶƐďƵƌǇ ?ƐĂŶŬ ?ĂŶĚ^ĂŝŶƐďƵƌǇ ?Ɛ ?
ĚŽĞƐŶŽƚďĞĂƌ  “ƐŝŐŶŝĨŝĐĂŶƚƌĞƐƉŽŶƐŝďŝůŝƚǇ ?ĨŽƌĂŶ ŝŶĨƌŝŶŐĞŵĞŶƚŽĨƌƚŝĐůĞ ? ? ?d&hďǇDĂƐƚĞƌĂƌĚ ŝŶ
relation to the setting of the UK MIF. ? 
140 See paras 344 et seq, and see also Wardhaugh supra. 
141 See further infra re follow-on damages awards by the CAT. 
142 See para 423. 
143 Ibid. 
144 At paras 479 et seq. see in particular para 480. 
145 Directive 2014/104/EU on certain rules governing actions for damages under national law for 
infringements of the competition law provisions of the Member States and of the European Union 
 ? “ƚŚĞĂŵĂŐĞƐŝƌĞĐƚŝǀĞ ? ? ? 
146 Ibd, Articles 13 and 14. 
147 Para 481.  
148 Para 484:-  ‘tĞĂŐƌĞĞǁŝƚŚƚŚĞƐƵďŵŝƐƐŝŽŶƐŽĨDĂƐƚĞƌĂƌĚ ?ƚŚĂƚƚŚĞƉĂƐƐ-ŽŶ “ĚĞĨĞŶĐĞ ?ŝƐŶŽŵŽƌĞ
than an aspect of the process of the assessment of damage. The pass-ŽŶ “ĚĞĨĞŶĐĞ ?ŝƐŝŶƌĞĂůŝƚǇŶŽƚĂ
defence at all: it simply reflects the need to ensure that a claimant is sufficiently compensated, and 
not over-compensated, by a defendant. The corollary is that the defendant is not forced to pay more 
than compensatory damages, when considering all of the potential claimants. ? 
149 Ibid at para. 484.  
150 At paras 527-547  and note the conclusions in particular at para 546.  
151 21 December 2016 Case 1241/5/7/15 (T) ^ĂŝŶƐďƵƌǇ ?Ɛ^ ƵƉĞƌŵĂƌŬĞƚƐ>ƚĚǀDĂƐƚĞƌĐĂƌĚInc and others 
[2016] CAT 11, [2016] CAT 26. 
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noted that albeit outwith the period for this case-law review, there has been a ruling in the 
High Court in a related dispute by a retailer against Mastercard which is at odds with the CAT 
ruling, in Asda Stores Ltd v Mastercard Inc.152 Popplewell J held that the multilateral 
interchange fees charged by Mastercard to card issuers and acquirers fell outside the scope 
of Art 101(1) on the basis of the ancillary restraints doctrine as they were objectively 
necessary to the main operation of the scheme as a whole, which in itself was either neutral 
or pro-competitive . In the hypothetical counterfactual, if the card operator set its fee at zero, 
the scheme would collapse and issuers would switch to a rival card operator. It is likely that 
both the CAT and High Court ruling will be appealed, and the Court of Appeal will require to 
resolve the inconsistent approaches in the two first instance cases. This will be significant 
both in terms of the damages awards and their assessment (given there are a number of 
similar/related actions against Mastercard) and the consideration of the substantive 
ƉƌŝŶĐŝƉůĞƐŝŶƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƚŽDĂƐƚĞƌĐĂƌĚ ?ƐĂƌƌĂŶŐĞŵĞŶƚƐ ? 
 
Abuse of Dominance 
In Arriva The Shires Ltd v London Luton Airport Operations Ltd,153 ATS had a concession 
ĂŐƌĞĞŵĞŶƚǁŝƚŚƚŚĞŽƉĞƌĂƚŽƌŽĨ>ƵƚŽŶŝƌƉŽƌƚ ? ‘>ƵƚŽŶKƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƐ ? ?ƚŽĐĂƌƌǇƉĂƐƐĞŶŐĞƌƐ ?ŽǀĞƌ
1 million a year) on the 757 bus service from the airport direct to London Victoria. Following 
a tender process, the concession was awarded to a rival bus operator. ATS claimed that Luton 
Operations was dominant in the market for granting rights to operate bus services and that 
they had abused it in two ways: 1) the tender procedure in awarding the new concession was 
unfair, and 2) through the abusive terms contained in the award of the new concession to the 
rival bus operator. The first part of the claim was unsuccessful as the tender process was fair, 
but the seven year exclusive period awarded to the successful tender bid operator was 
deemed to be abusive. The analysis and application of the abuse and objective justification in 
this judgment merits further analysis. It was noted that exclusionary abuses fall into two 
categories, where the dominant undertaking: a) competes on the downstream market and is 
acting to foreclose that market to its own advantage;154 or b) distorts competition on the 
upstream market between itself and its competitors by entering contracts with customers to 
buy exclusively from the dominant undertaking.155 This case clearly did not fall within the 
ƐĞĐŽŶĚ ĐĂƚĞŐŽƌǇ ďƵƚ ZŽƐĞ : ƌĞũĞĐƚĞĚ ƚŚĞ ĚĞĨĞŶĚĂŶƚ ?Ɛ ĂƐƐĞƌƚŝŽŶ ƚŚĂƚ ƚŽ ĨĂůů ǁŝƚŚŝŶ ƚŚĞ ĨŝƌƐƚ
category the dominant undertaking had to derive a competitive advantage or commercial 
benefit through the exclusionary conduct; for instance, by using its dominance in one market 
to improve its own position in a downstream market.156 Clearly, Luton Operations were not 
active on the downstream bus services market, but in any event they gained important 
commercial and financial advantages from the concession which gave them a percentage of 
revenue earned by the bus operator. Rose J also held that the grant of an exclusive right to 
the bus route for a lengthy period of seven years affected competition on that downstream 
market and was anti-competitive. This reasoning is analogous with European Commission 
decisions in relation to the grant of media rights to broadcast football matches over an 
                                                          
152 30 January 2017, [2017] EWHC 93 (Comm). 
153 ? ? ? ? ? ?t, ? ? ?Ś ? ? 
154^ĞĞŽŵŵĞƌĐŝĂů^ŽůǀĞŶƚƐǀŽŵŵŝƐƐŝŽŶ ? ? ? ? ? ?Z ? ? ? ?dŚŝƐŝƐĂůƐŽƚŚĞƚǇƉĞŽĨĂďƵƐĞŝŶǀŽůǀĞĚŝŶ
WƵƌƉůĞWĂƌŬŝŶŐ ? 
155^ĞĞĨŽƌŝŶƐƚĂŶĐĞĂƐĞ ? ? ? ? ? ? ?WdŽŵƌĂ^ǇƐƚĞŵƐ^ǀŽŵŵŝƐƐŝŽŶ ? ? ? ? ? ? ?D>Z ? ? ? 
156 ^ĞĞ ĨŽƌĞǆĂŵƉůĞĂƐĞd ? ? ? ? ? ? ?ĞƌŽƉŽƌƚƐĚĞWĂƌŝƐǀŽŵŵŝƐƐŝŽŶ  ? ? ? ? ? ?Z // ? ? ? ? ? ?ĂŶĚ^> ?
/ŵƉĞƌŝĂů>ƚĚǀdŚĞƌŝƚŝƐŚ^ƚĂŶĚĂƌĚƐ/ŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶ ? ? ? ? ? ?t, ? ? ? ?Ś ? ? 
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extended period.157 As in Purple Parking, it was stressed that the objective justification 
defence was not available simply where a business decision was commercially rational; 
prohibited abusive conduct normally invariably furthers the business interests of the 
dominant undertaking. Both these cases demonstrate a robust approach to abusive conduct 
and a restrictive approach to defences based on the objective justification for dominant 
ƵŶĚĞƌƚĂŬŝŶŐƐ ?ďƵƐŝŶĞƐƐĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶƐ ? 
 
Streetmap.EU Ltd v Google Inc,158 involved another alleged abuse of a dominant position 
ŝŶǀŽůǀŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ  ‘ŝŶƚĞƌĂĐƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ ĐŽŵƉĞƚŝƚŝŽŶ ďĞƚǁĞĞŶ ŽŶůŝŶĞ ƐĞĂƌĐŚ engines and competition 
between suppliers of online maps. ?159 Basically the claimant contented that the preferential 
and prominent display of their own online map product restricted competition from 
competing suppliers of online maps. It was accepted for these purposes that Google held a 
dominant position in online search engines. The discussion on the case focused on the actual 
or potential anti-competitive effect of the alleged distortion of competition in online maps. 
Evidence of actual effect was required and it was not abusive where the effect was on a 
separate market from the market where the undertaking was dominant and the effect was 
not appreciable. There was considerable evidence to the effect that the Google Maps Onebox 
innovation had not had an appreciable effect in taking custom away from the claimant and 
was not reasonably likely to give effect to anti-competitive foreclosure. Roth J proceeded to 
make obiter observations ŝŶ ƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶ ƚŽ ƚŚĞ ĚĞĨĞŶĚĂŶƚ ?Ɛ alternative argument based on 
objective justification,. Roth J considered their commercial strategy to be objectively justified 
in order to secure efficiency gains and there were other effective, proportionate or viable 
alternatives that they could use to achieve the same legitimate aim.160There were specific 
technical arguments to suppoƌƚ 'ŽŽŐůĞ ?Ɛ ƌĞǀŝƐĞĚ ĐŽŵŵĞƌĐŝĂů ƐƚƌĂƚĞŐǇ ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞƌĞ ǁĂƐ
considerable evidential support, but the validity of a commercial strategy is clearly justiciable 
and courts will not simply accept a plain argument that there was a commercial decision to 
objectively justify a strategy. 
 
 
Follow-on Damages Actions 
Given the relative dearth of final damages awards in the UK,161 ƚŚĞd ?ƐƌƵůŝŶŐŝŶ  ? ? ? ?ŝŶ
Albion water Limitred v Dwr Cymru Cyfngedig,162 takes on added significance as only the 2nd 
award of damages by the CAT under s 47A, following the 2Travel award in 2012.163  This was 
an incredibly lengthy legal saga with a decision by the water regulator followed by numerous 
rulings by the CAT, an appeal to the Court of Appeal, and subsequently various stages of a 
successful follow-on damages action, again before the CAT.164 The dispute arose out of a 
                                                          
157^ĞĞŽŵŵŝƐƐŝŽŶĞĐŝƐŝŽŶ ?ĂƐĞKDW ? ? ? ? ? ? ?:ŽŝŶƚ^ĞůůŝŶŐŽĨƚŚĞDĞĚŝĂZŝŐŚƚƐƚŽƚŚĞ&WƌĞŵŝĞƌ
>ĞĂŐƵĞ ? ? ?DĂƌĐŚ ? ? ? ? ? 
158 12 February 2016, [2016] EWHC 253 (Ch). 
159 Per J Roth at para. 4. 
160 See generally paras 142-177. 
161 See Laborde supra, although that has been superceded by ^ĂŝŶƐďƵƌǇ ?Ɛ ^ƵƉĞƌŵĂƌŬĞƚƐ >ƚĚ ǀ
Mastercard Inc and others, and there have been two final damages awards by the CAT. 
162 8 March 2013 Case 1166/5/7/10 Albion water Limited v Dwr Cymru Cyfngedig, [2013] CAT 6. 
163 2 Travel Group Plc (In Liquidation) v Cardiff City Transport Services Ltd [2012] CAT 9. 
164^ĞĞŝŶƚĞƌĂůŝĂ ? ? ? ? ? ? ?d ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?d ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?tŝǀ ? ? ? ?  ? ? ? ? ?d ? ? ?ĂŶĚ ? ? ? ? ? ?d
 ? ?
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ĐŽŵƉůĂŝŶƚďǇůďŝŽŶtĂƚĞƌ>ŝŵŝƚĞĚ  ? ‘ůďŝŽŶ ? ?ĂŐĂŝŶƐƚǁƌǇŵƌƵǇĨǇŶŐĞĚŝŐ  ? ‘ǁƌǇŵƌƵ ? ?
under the 1998 Act Chapter II prohibition in relation to the price quoted by Dwr Cymru for 
the common carriage of water across the relevant part of its network, claiming the price 
constituted a margin squeeze and was discriminatory. Albion complained to the Authority, 
which, under the Water Act 2003, was the specialist regulator for the water industry and given 
powers to apply the 1998 Act. The Authority, in 2004, rejected the complaint, but on appeal, 
the CAT found that Dwr Cymru was dominant165 and that it had abused that position by 
imposing a margin squeeze.166 An appeal to the Court of Appeal by Dwr Cymru was rejected167 
and subsequently the CAT also held that the access price Dwr Cymru proposed to charge 
Albion for common carriage through its water pipe network was an excessive and unfair price 
which was abusive.168 Following this outcome in the lengthy public enforcement process, 
ůďŝŽŶ ƌĂŝƐĞĚ Ă ĐůĂŝŵ ĨŽƌ ĚĂŵĂŐĞƐ ĂŐĂŝŶƐƚ ǁƌ ǇŵƌƵ ŝŶ ƌĞůŝĂŶĐĞ ŽŶ ƚŚĞ d ?Ɛ ŚĂƉƚĞƌ //
infringement findings. In 2013, it was awarded over £1.8m (plus interest) in damages as a 
result of the high and abusive price it paid to Dwr Cymru meaning it lost profits under one 
contract and lost the chance to win another potentially lucrative contract.169 This was a 
relatively straightforward application of the causation test, and an assessment of quantifiable 
ĚĂŵĂŐĞƐƚŽĞŶƐƵƌĞƚŚĂƚǄƌǇŵƌƵ ?Ă ?ǁĂƐůŝĂďůĞƚŽƉĂǇůďŝŽŶ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?ŝŶƌĞƐƉĞĐƚŽĨ
ůďŝŽŶ ?ƐĐůĂŝŵĨŽƌůŽƐƐĂƌŝƐŝŶŐŝŶƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƚŽƚŚĞƐƵƉƉůǇŽĨǁĂƚĞƌƚŽ^ŚŽƚƚŽŶWĂƉĞƌ ?ĂŶĚ ?ď ?ǁĂƐ
liable to pay Albion £160,149. ? ? ŝŶ ƌĞƐƉĞĐƚ ŽĨ ůďŝŽŶ ?Ɛ ĐůĂŝŵ ĨŽƌ ůŽƐƐ ĂƌŝƐŝŶŐ ĨƌŽŵƚŚĞ ůŽƐƚ
opportunity to supply water to Corus Shotton.170 It should be stressed that exemplary 
damages were not awarded as in 2Travel, although following the implementation of the 
Antitrust Damages Directive in the UK,171 exemplary damages will no longer be available in 
any event in relation to infringements of either EU or UK competition law. 
 
 
ŽŶĐůƵƐŝŽŶƐ 
 
Overall, the research has identified some interesting themes emerging from the development 
of competition law litigation in the UK courts between 2013 and 2016. Although the research 
ƐĞĞŬƐƚŽďĞ “ĐŽŵƉƌĞŚĞŶƐŝǀĞ ?ŝƚŝƐĐůĞĂƌƚŚĂƚĚƵĞƚŽƚŚĞƉƌĞǀĂůĞŶĐĞŽĨƐĞƚƚůĞŵĞŶƚĂĐƚŝǀŝƚǇ ?ƚŚĞ
published judgments represent only a partial view of competition litigation strategy in the 
United Kingdom. Nonetheless, 2016 in particular has witnessed a dramatic rise in competition 
law judgments and it will be interesting to see if this is a trend that continues in future years. 
The nature of the litigation process in the UK courts means that there are considerably more 
judgments than disputes given the multiple judgments in various cases at different stages of 
the litigation. There are case clusters dealing with a number of significant procedural issues 
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of 2 per cent above the base rate from the date of infringement until payment. An additional claim for 
exemplary damages, as discussed below, was rejected by the Tribunal.  
171 The Damages Directive Statutory Instrument- Claims in respect of Loss or Damage arising from 
Competition Infringements (Competition Act 1998 and other Enactments (Amendment) Regulations 
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such as limitation, disclosure and the interplay with EU proceedings, together with interesting 
judgments on substantive law, particularly in relation to abuse of dominance. The increasing 
consideration and application of competition law principles to disputes in technological 
markets is also evidenced by the case-law in this period. The conflicting analysis of the anti-
competitive effects of the Mastercard MIF scheme by the CAT in 2016 and the High Court 
early in 2016 will certainly require to be resolved by the Court of Appeal and perhaps the 
Supreme Court. Despite the continued limited number of final substantive judgments in the 
period, at least that CAT ruling and its earlier judgment in Welsh Water are examples of the 
ĐŽƵƌƚƐ ?ƚƌĞĂƚŵĞŶƚŽĨƚŚĞĂƐƐĞƐƐŵĞŶƚĂŶĚƋƵĂŶƚŝĨŝĐĂƚŝŽŶŽĨĚĂŵĂŐĞƐ ?ŝŶŽŶůǇƚŚĞ ?nd and 3rd 
cases involving the final award of damages in the UK. Despite the specialist nature of the CAT 
as a competition tribunal, the case-law in the period reflects a significant continued role for 
the High Court, and certainly not simply in stand-alone abuse cases. Nonetheless, following 
thĞ ŽŶƐƵŵĞƌ ZŝŐŚƚƐ Đƚ  ? ? ? ? ƌĞĨŽƌŵƐ ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞ ĞǆƚĞŶƐŝŽŶŽĨ ƚŚĞ ƐĐŽƉĞ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ d ?Ɛ
jurisdiction, the 2016 case-law demonstrates a recent increase in the number of claims being 
raised before the CAT, including resort to the CAT for consumer claims under the new 
collective redress regime which allows for opt-out proceedings. In the following years we will 
look to consider to what extent the CAT becomes the central forum for all competition law 
ĐůĂŝŵƐ ? ǁŚĞƚŚĞƌ ƚŚĞ ĐŽůůĞĐƚŝǀĞ ƌĞĚƌĞƐƐ ƐĐŚĞŵĞ ŝƐ  ‘ƐƵĐĐĞƐƐĨƵů ?, and what if any, are the 
implications for competition law private enforcement practice in the UK of the 
implementation of the Antitrust Damages Directive and the (related) impending exit of the 
UK from the European Union. 
 
